The Failure of the Arab League in Solving Inter-State disputes

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Abstract:

This study presents a detailed examination of the Arab League developments and it is role in an effort to understand the cause of it is failure as a regional security organization. Additionally, the study looks at the Arab League's conditions of emergence and the relations between the Arab member states with the focus on Arab national security as the main concept determining it is security role. The authoritarian state systems of most of the member states of the Arab League make it difficult to regard the organization decisions as steps supporting democracy. The League's democratic stance is indeed an outcome of pressure of revolutions and harmony of interests among the member states. Meanwhile, strengthening democracy in the Arab world seems like an unrealistic desire of member states, these decisions push every member state towards thinking about change and pave the way for democratic reform process. Additionally, the purpose of this study has been to critically review the role and performance of the Arab League as a regional security organization in order to evaluate the reasons, contexts and dynamics of failure to develop fully as a regional security organization. This study also was a critical examination of the conditions of emergence and internal dynamics of the Arab League set within inter-Arab relations

Keywords: Arab League, inter-Arab relations, national security, Arab spring.

Introduction:

The Arab League is founded in March 1945 and it is a federation of 22 Arab states, including Palestine, who is broad mission is to improve coordination among it is member states on matters of common interest. The Arab League was charted in response to concerns about postwar colonial divisions of territory as well as strong [position to the establishment of the Israeli state in Palestine. During the Second World War, the British pledged full support for Arab Unity. This policy was expressed by the British foreign secretary Anthony Eden in his Mansion House Speech in May 1941. Henceforth, Arab leaders embarked on negotiations for a pan-Arab union that will bolster support for the Palestinian people. The process culminated in 1944 with the Alexandria protocol, the document that laid plans for the Arab League. In 1948, five Arab states of the newly formed regional body took up arms against the Jewish following it's declaration of independence. The conflict marked the first major action of the League and the first of several bloody conflicts between Arab states and Israeli forces over the future of Palestine. The resulting Arab defeats in 1948 as well as in 1967, was a defining moment.1

Meanwhile, the Arab League has long been criticized for disunity and poor governance, in which it has traditionally been representative of it is various autoerotic regimes than of Arab citizens. According to the Arab League charter, it is founding members(Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen) agreed to seek close cooperation on matters of economics, communication, culture, nationality, social welfare, and health. They agreed also on renouncing violence for the settlement of conflicts between members and empowered the organization to mediate in such disputes, as well as in those with non-members. Additionally, they agreed to collaborate in military affairs, and this accord was strengthened with a 1950 Pact committing members to treat acts of aggression on any member state as an act against all. Some positive developments in the Arab League's actions in Libya, where the League supported a no-fly zone and the ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi. Additionally, in the Syrian crisis, where it orchestrated a fact-finding mission to observe the conflict and called on Bashar al-Assad to step down after months of deadly clashes with protesters. However, the Arab League has no mechanism to compel it is member states with it is resolutions, avoid that led critics to describe the League as a glorified debating society. The League's charter states that decisions reached by a majority should bind only those member states that accept them, which by and large places a premium on national sovereignty and limits the organization's ability to take collective action. On the other hand, some actions are taken under the aegis of the Arab League, but they are executed only by small faction. For instance, during the civil war in Lebanon, the Arab

League had limited success to help negotiate a peace, but it was Saudi Arabia and Syria that helped end the conflict by convening the Taif Agreement.2

The Arab League was traditionally dominated by Egypt since it is creation in 1945. It hosted the League's headquarters and the offices of many of it is specialized agencies, and provided most of the permanent staff. Other problems have also weakened the Arab League is the inter—Arab frictions, which have been equal importance in explaining the organization's comparative eclipse in recent years. Indeed, inter-Arab differences over the Palestine question, and events in Lebanon particularly and in the Arab world in general, developed as a further major source of regional tensions. The Arab League will continue torpor in which other bodies like the Gulf Cooperation Council continue to enhance it is role as agency for promoting cooperation and also mediating in disputes between Arab states. At the same time, issues which might have prompted concerted League's action were dealt with at the level of individual states. Therefore, unless inter-Arab frictions ease, there is little doubt that the Arab League's stature and influence will continue to decline.3

The Arab League has been conceived since it is foundation as part of a broad and ambitious political project that could have led to the creation of a single Arab state in the Middle East. As a first step to achieve this final goal, the Arab member states rejected the use of force for the settlement of disputes between the member states. The council of the Arab League was from it is inception designated as the provider of good offices in order to mediate disputes that could have led to the use of force, and also as the forum in which acts of aggressions should be addressed. Yet the Middle East has not been immune from war and violence since 1945.Inter-state and colonial wars such as the three Arab-Israeli wars and the 1990-91 Gulf war have caused at least 1.5 million causalities. Additionally, the Middle East is the most ethnically fragmented region in the world and has been plagued by a series of protracted civil wars and ethnic struggles, which have led to the death of more than 2 million and also the displacement of more millions, mainly in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya.4

Meanwhile, the Arab League one can suggest that is a bleak experience of regional cooperation, or even a failed organization. This failure not only to prevent and manage regional conflicts, but to generate cooperation between the member states in the political, military and economic spheres. Today, and from the academic viewpoint, the Arab League can be considered as a failed organization, but rather on establishing what accounts for it is failure, a failure of design as opposed to having been designed to fail.5 The record of the Arab League in mediating regional crisis is indeed a bleak one, claiming that the Arab organization is a failed one.6 This article will highlight the Arab League performance in relation to various types of wars and conflicts such as inter-state wars, civil wars, boundary wars and political crisis. Meanwhile, the significant feature of the Arab

League is that the organization proved hesitant to mediate in civil crisis when major regional powers were involved. Additionally, the organization failed to mediate in most inter-state wars in the Middle East. However, the Arab League intervened repeatedly in minor wars, and succeeded in promoting a partial settlement in 40 percent of the recorded boundary wars and political crisis. The limited successes of the League seem to be associated with specific institutional , political or ideological resources from which the organization could draw in it is conflict prevention or resolution activity, that is to say it is long term role as guarantor of settlements in unstable states, the ideological clout of the organization council and also the prestige of the League's Secretary General.7

Amore nuanced assessment of the contribution of the institutional body of the Arab League, provides more precise basis not only for assessing the real achievement of the League, and also for orienting the process of internal reform that the organization urgently need to undertake in order to increase it is efficiency and effectiveness in tackling conflicts in the region. The paper will highlight the historical and institutional development of the Arab League and it is failure. Also the paper will highlight the methodological problems and will lay the foundations analysis of the organization performance. Additionally the paper will examine the Arab relations and divisions and the Arab League opportunity for reforms. The conclusion will discuss the implications of these findings for the regional conflict resolution in the Arab World and the prospects for creating a more effective conflict resolution and management regime in the Arab World in the future.

The Arab League and it is Institutional Framework and Political Developments:

The roots of the Arab League draw on the Pan-Arab projects in the 19th century, particularly as a reaction to the decline of the Ottoman Empire rule over the Arab states.8 During the Second World War, plans for the creation of a unified Arab state were a actively supported by Great Britain. In May 1941, the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden explicitly declared his country's support for plans helping Arab states to achieve a greater degree of unity than they enjoy. In January 1943, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said made public scheme for the creation of a unified Arab state encompassing Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine called the Fertile Crescent Scheme. This scheme was not greeted with enthusiasm in the region. Meanwhile, the representative of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine agreed to meet in Alexandria to discuss the possibility of creating some form of political union across the Arab World. The Alexandria protocol was the final document of the meeting which provided the blueprint for a loose confederation of independent Arab states, which will have held periodic meetings in order to strengthen the bilateral relations between them and also favored political cooperation. Furthermore, a modified version of the Alexandria Protocol was signed on 22 March

1945 in Egypt by the delegates of Egypt itself, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia which became the foundational Pact of the Arab League. Yemen joined the Arab League in May 1945.9

The institutional structure of the Arab League was centered around three core bodies:

    1- The Council.

    2- The permanent Secretariat.

    3- A number of permanent committees.

All Arab states have one seat and a single vote in the council. Ordinary council sessions of the League are convened two times every year and accordingly it is decisions are binding only on member states who have voted them. The position of Secretary General which was covered by Egyptian nationals was initially conceived as a principal administrative position, but rapidly acquired greater prominence than the other League bodies as the real steering force behind the League's regional activism. Additionally, the pact provided also for the establishment of various specialized committees focused on other issues such as cultural and economic issues. In November 1946, these committees were supplemented by the political committee, whose competence overlapped with those of the council, but because of it is less formalized procedures, gradually acquired significant prominence at the latter. Notwithstanding, the duty of the League council to intervene in any regional dispute, was incorporated in the final pact in which the council shall mediate in all differences which might threaten to lead to war between two member states, or between a member state and a third state. Meanwhile, the modalities and procedures for such interventions as specified by the League's pact are considered, then the League seems to have lost it is teeth when compared to the spirit of the institutional framework out line in the Alexandria protocol. While article 5 of the League's pact prohibits the use of force between member states and then allows arbitration and mediation decisions in regional disputes to be taken by the League's council with majority vote, article 6 of the pact adds that in a case of aggression the League's council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures that are necessary to deal with such acts. Although, the text does not provide a clear definition of aggression, thus, all regional conflicts and crisis since the creation of the Organization have been portrayed by member states and approached by the League as aggressions, and then each resolution had to undergo a lengthy and complex process of consensus building.10 The disastrous failure of the Arab League member states to agree on the membership of Gaza government and the military and diplomatic debacle of the Arab countries in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was partially downsized these expectations and inaugurated a gradual process of formal and informal adaptation of the League's legal features and internal procedures. In 1950, the Arab Collective Security Pact was signed to ensure a higher level of cooperation against external threats.11 Meanwhile, the Egyptian President

Jamal Abdel Nasser inaugurated in 1964 the practice of summits conferences of the Arab head of states. These conferences held every one or two years, created a new forum for policy coordination in the Arab World, in which marginalized the role of the main institutional bodies of the League. The expansion of the membership of the Arab League with the accession of Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the Arab Gulf states, Mauritania, Somalia and Djibouti. However, the failure of the Arab collective security pact to generate anything close to collective security during the second Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and also the absence of prospects for economic cooperation in the region encouraged the development of closer sub-regional ties at the expense of pan-Arab schemes. Meanwhile, in 1970 Boutros Boutros Ghali called for the Arab League to encourage the creation of four functional sub-regional units, namely, the Fertile Crescent, the Arab Gulf, the Maghreb and finally the Northeastern Triangle of Libya, Sudan and Egypt.12 Finally, in 1981, the Arab Gulf States witnessed the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council constituted the first formal step towards the foundation of sub-regional institutional for a, to be followed in 1989 by the Arab Maghreb Union and the Arab Cooperation Council.13

The Failure of the Arab League as a Regional Organization:

The Arab League so far has proven to be at best a bleak experience of regional cooperation, and at worst the single least effective major regional organization in generating political and military cooperation to prevent and manage regional conflicts. However, the Arab League successfully mediated in twelve percent of the conflicts which took place in the Arab world. Hence, the organization met with success in only six of seventy seven conflicts situation it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981.14 The proximate causes of the Arab League's under-performance are apparent. The organization boasts ambitious goals and a powerful symbolic association to a widespread transnational ideology, and as the hands of it is crucial organs are tied by the unanimity rule, the League's agenda is little more than the lowest common denominator of the desires of the organization's member states. The gradual shrinking of the League's prerogatives in the process that led to the final pact testifies how the organization's member states showed early on great reluctance to assign substantial powers to a supra-national organization. In other words, the League seems to incarnate the ambiguities of the pan-Arab scheme at it is height, trapped between the quest for Arab unity and the centrifugal forces favoring Arab separatism.15 During the period of 1946-1977, it was witnessed different configurations of opposing blocs, typically generated by local strategic and dynastic quarrels mainly the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and anti- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan divide, the development of the nonaligned movement and cold war rivalries. Some analysis argue that the disastrous performance of the Arab League could be from tackling the issue from a social

constructivist perspective, and the debacle of the organization was not the consequence of a paralysis or failure of design, but rather that the League was deliberately designed to fail. " The politics of Arab nationalism and a shared identity led Arab states to embrace the rhetoric and to fear Arab unity in practice because it would impose greater restrictions on their sovereignty". 16 In this sense, the ambiguous approach of Arab states towards the role of the Arab League in the region will reflect a deeper ambiguity in the bases for legitimacy of Arab states, which draw their strength both from local civic nationalism and from claiming allegiance to the wider Arab identity in the form of a trans-national nationalism. Henceforth, the organization was decisive in providing a settlement for the regional disputes and thus, the League was in fact less effective in resolving regional conflicts or disputes . Since the creation of the League and until 2008, the organization mediated in 19 out of 56 conflicts that developed in the region, achieving full success on five occasions. Therefore, the performance of the Arab League differs significantly when specific types of conflict or crisis are considered, and that this might impact significantly on how the organization's performance as compares to that of other regional organizations. 17

The record of the Arab League in dealing with conflict resolution is extremely disappointing mainly in relation to civil wars. The organization is created to guarantee the respect for the independence and sovereignty of Arab countries, thus, it has often hesitated to become involved in internal strife's, even when they evolved into sub-regional crises with the intervention of neighboring states. In fact the Arab League intervened as mediator in only five of the twenty two major civil wars that occurred in the region since it is establishment in 1945. Regarding the League intervention on the occasion of the major civil wars that plagued the Middle East, what emerges is a significant indecisiveness of the organization formal and informal bodies, mainly in the early stages of their development. For instance, the Arab League council approved a draft resolution on April 4th , 1958 to address the first Lebanese civil war, and yet failed to develop a formal resolution. Additionally, the rivalries made the 1964 summit meeting on the Yemen civil war similarly inconclusive, and thus prevented the creation of a consensus on the upgrade of the fact-finding mission that the organization had dispatched to Yemen in October 1963. Again when the Lebanese second civil war erupted in October 1975, the Arab League could agree only on calling on all the parties to exercise wisdom and restraint. However, the League did not express itself on the crises, by which it had developed into a major civil war. In practice, it is a persistent pattern of non-

Intervention in almost all major civil wars, which seems to reflect a shared interest by most Arab League members to reassert the rule and the inviolability of their boundaries from external interference. However, the organization activity was obstructed in practice because of such pressures

and had internalized it is role as a secondary actor when strong power political interests were involved. One can assume that the organization's organs seem to have accepted as early as it is creation to the present and also in the coming future, that their League was little more than a forum of collective legitimation for Arab countries and had no power as soon as major states interests were involved.18

Although, the Arab League intervened as mediator in the two Iraqi wars, the only inter-state wars that saw two members of the organization on opposing sides(Iraq and Syria). While the League's mediation attempts met with failure, there is no doubt that the organization made greater effort in tackling the first Iraq crisis which began with an open aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kuwait than it did with the 2003 Iraq war. Meanwhile, the Arab League does not define it is membership on the basis of geographical features but on ethnic ones. The League excludes from it is membership Iran and Turkey, which are often considered as parts of the wider Middle East, and thus, the organization includes as members a wide range of extra-regional countries such as Somalia, Mauritania and the Comoros, which identify themselves as part of the Arab world. Hence, employing the geographical boundaries of the Middle East as drawn by the correlates of war project in order to identify exactly the range of conflicts in which the Arab League can be expected to mediate is not entirely correct. Those boundaries represent the best approximation of the area in which the organization operates and allow clear-cut comparisons with other regional organizations. However, the Arab League's collective Security duties and it is membership criteria make comparisons of it is pattern of intervention in inter-state conflicts not fully homogeneous.19

Arab Relations and Divisions:

Since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, the Palestinian issue became integrated into the existing inter-Arab states rivalries. Added to that the Hashemite-Saudi rivalry over the proposed Hashemite scheme of unification of the Fertile Crescent under the Hashemite rule. Such an agenda was not in line with Egyptian-Saudi interests. Therefore, Jordan announced in 1950, it is annexation of the West Bank, a move that was welcomed by the British, but the Arab League opposed the move. The Arab collective defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 showed that there was a complete absence of military coordination. Furthermore, Jordan and Egypt worked openly against each other. Due to Jordan's annexation move, the Jordanian-Egyptian competition intensified and Egypt made a clear mind effort to expel the Kingdom from the Arab League, but failed. 20 Meanwhile, the division within the Arab League was written into the charter, and how this caused direct disagreement Arab States. They were trying to promote unity and Arab nationalism from one side and those who were advocating national sovereignty and non-intervention as the principle for relations. Examining the

relationship between Arab states formation and the cause of Palestine, many of the Arab countries decisions and approaches to Palestine issue were influenced by their awareness of Palestine in the Arab states internal politics and how such impacts affected the formation and development of the political systems of these states. In his speech to the Arab League in June 1988, late King Hussein stated that" State affiliation is a newly emergent phenomenon, if today prevailing thinking tends towards allegiance to the state, with a state identity occupying a dear place in the young generation's hearts, they should not be hard on their forbears and ours".21

In his speech, the late king attempted to justify his Kingdom's annexation of the West Bank in terms of the unionist and pan Arabism sentiments of an older generation. He also signaled the apparent ascendancy in Arab politics, and prefiguring his own efforts to insulate and consolidate the Kingdom through disengagement. Therefore, the historic patterns of state formation in the Arab World, and contemporary processes of state consolidation, have played an important role in shaping state responses to the Palestine issue. 22

When Egypt went a lone and signed a separate peace treaty with Israel at Camp David in 1979, a major crisis within the Arab League occurred. As a result, at the Baghdad Summit, the Arab League decided to suspend Egypt's membership and to move the League's headquarter to Tunisia. As a consequence of Egypt suspension led to the neutralization of the largest Arab state from having a direct contribution to Arab policy towards the Jewish state and the Palestinian issue. Consecutive confrontations with Israel during the 1980s and 1990 involved an Egyptian role as mediator only. For example, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which force the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization, no Arab state as well as the Arab League interfered. This by and large proved the limited effect the Palestinian issue and the conflict with Israel would have no internal Arab systems. At the Amman Summit in November 1987, the Arab League called for economic cooperation, reconciliation between Iraq and Syria, invited Egypt to return to the Arab League and completely ignored the PLO and the Palestinian issue. However, with the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in 1987, the Arab League expressed strong support for the solidarity with the Palestinian issue. In 1988 the Arab League encouraged the Kingdom of Jordan to declare it is disengagement from the West Bank.23

The Madrid Peace process of 1991 came in the period following the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait by an international coalition led by the United States. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the damage done to joint Arab efforts, Arab national security and the direct involvement of external forces in the region politically as well as militarily, resulted in serious changes to the Arab League's influence and regional dynamics. The Madrid Conference was lunched in this new context

and also during a period of weakness of the Arab League. Through reviewing Arab relations and divisions, it became clear that inter-Arab relations and rivalries dominated from the early days of the Arab League to the present. The main obstacle facing the Arab League is Israel's occupation of Palestine and the American bias toward Israel is greatly weakening the Arab League. The United States Administration provides economic , security, military and political support to Israel. This type of policy is indeed the biggest obstacle facing the development of the Arab position. Therefore, the failure of the consecutive American administrations to make a break-through for peace in the region is creating a serious problem for Arab affairs and of course weakening the Arab League's role and position.24

The Arab League's development and conduct were influenced by inter-Arab divisions since the creation of the League. The state of rivalry among the Leagues member states had an impact on the focus, policy and direction of the Arab League by dividing the member states into competing blocs. The alliance among member states shifted from 1940s until 1970s based on ideological and political grounds. Hence, the most significant dividing factor that affected the League's ability to positively play it is security role was the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had severe consequences for Arab states relations, and the most serious of which was the American occupation of Iraq from 2003 onwards. The regional implications of that crisis are still witnessed in the region as it reshaped inter-Arab alliances as well as Arab states relations with other regional and international powers. Meanwhile, majority of the conflicts between Arab states are border disputes and an unspecific political nature.25 Regional and international forces have been proven to complicate security in the Arab World and challenge the Arab League's ability to act. The foreign presence in the Arab states weakens the political integrity of the Arab League even though a number of League member states find it useful. This leads to the question, why do some Arab states locate their security interests in arrangements with foreign countries, despite the existence of the Arab League? One can argue that Arab countries do not oppose establishing military Arab cooperation, but due to the previous historical experience and weak coordination among Arab states like the Gulf states accepted external offers from the United States to safeguard their national security.26

It seems that the Arab League's performance was not consistent in all forms of conflict. Hence, the organization was less inclined to intervene in conflicts that involved certain major Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Syria, and that it has been subject to balance of power considerations. Furthermore, the League was not willing to intervene in most border disputes. All these limitations left very little room for the organization to function as the League intended to provide security and stability among it is members. It was until 2010 and 2011 that the organization began to play a role internal conflicts and

border disputes between it is member states. For instance, the League's decisions and mediation efforts in the crisis between Sudan and South Sudan in 2010, and the Arab Springs or revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The Arab organization's record is disappointing in civil wars. Therefore, this can be attributed to the principle of respect for independence and sovereignty in the Arab League charter. In fact, the organization has intervened as mediator in only five of the twenty two major civil wars that occurred in the region since 1945. However, the League's performance and inability to resolve conflicts, disputes, and security concern, it is possible to conclude that the organization has proved unable to act as an effective regional organization.27

Today it is fair to say that the Arab League has failed to the extent that it can no longer function as a viable regional security organization or can it still recover from it is numerous performance failure. In spite of the complexities in the Arab League's history and limitations and problems, the organization that tries to get involved and influence it is region. Thus, the League's positions from the uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen from 2011 to the present are an example of the League's resilience and adaptation to the changes in regional dynamics and power. However, the Arab world has long been viewed as a region that best first the realist view of international politics.28

The Arab League Opportunity for Reforms:

The League of Arab States has two main features and continues to struggle with disunity and dysfunction. The critics to the Arab organization wonder whether it has any relevance in it is current form. Hence, the League failed to coordinate it is policy over both the 1990-91 first Gulf war and the United States-Western coalition of the 2003 Iraq war. It is argued that the League's measure competence in terms of result and achievements, it is not competent simply because the organization have not achieved anything. In his opinion the General Secretary of the Arab League Nabil al-Araby criticize the function of the Arab League in September 2011, by describing the organization as 'impotent'.29 The Arab League turned it is focus to the Syrian crisis, and suspended it is membership in November, brokered an ill-fated peace agreement with Bashar al-Assad, for the first time in the League's history, assembled a team of observers to monitor the implementation of it is plan. Frustrated with a lack of compliance by the Assad's regime, the League officially called for Bashar to step down in January 2012 and the requested a resolution from the United Nations Security Council to support this proposal . On the other hand the Arab Organization recognized the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Meanwhile, the Syrian allies in the Arab League such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Algeria blocked the oppositions full assumption of the role. If the Arab organization is likely to improve little on it is record of collective action until the League's member

states agree to sacrifice some sovereignty and comply with the League's resolutions. Last but not least, until democracy is the mainstay of the Arab world, the Arab League will continue to struggle with issues of legitimacy. Therefore, it is argued that the organization's effectiveness over the course of it is 71 year of history has slowly eroded as disputes between it is member states increase.30

In recent years, there has been growing momentum for the League of Arab states to reform it is charter and also it is approach to handling regional crisis. At the Arab League conference held in Tunis in 2004, the Arab states pledged to establish a mechanism that would reform the way and means Arab League decisions are implemented. But as usual, the Tunis conference ended without any concrete steps toward reform as infighting took it is toll and Libya threatened to withdraw from the Arab organization. Finally, the reforms discussion was postponed to further Arab summits. Although, the Arab states are wary of reform because it will empower the organization with measures to sanction or censure members who defy a resolution. Additionally, this kind of reform will give more power to the Arab League, and thus, lessens that of the state. The authoritative power of member states would gradually be minimized exactly as in the European Commission, and hence, this is not accepted in the Arab World. However, reform of the Arab League depends particularly on how much commitment the Arab Leaders are ready to offer on one hand, and on the other, how much power they will give the General Secretariat of the organization. Hence, this type of reform was disagreed on from the League's member states. For example, in January, 2005, Algeria proposed a rotating seat for the Secretary General(A post dominated by Egypt since it is creation), which led the Algerian to withdrawn the proposal after it threatened to divide the Arab League into two camps. Since then no other substantial steps have been taken in order to even propose reform to the Arab League.31 The Arab League has ignored the demands of the Arab nations. The persistence of inter-regime disputes, sectarian tensions, and the presence of the American forces in the region have al played a role in the failure of the Arab League to prevent or resolve regional conflicts or disputes.32 The Arab League's policies and positions that have been taken in 2011 and 2012, illustrate that respect for human rights principles and international law is very slow and increasingly featuring the work of the organization. The League has missed countless opportunities to play a constructive and decisive role systematically ensuring that all member states respect and protect human rights at all times. The changing balance of power in the Arab World as dictated by the emergence of new political leadership in some Arab states, and also the functioning of the treaty body which oversees implementation of the Arab League charter on human rights, as well as the reform process to be taken place within the organization itself. However, one can assume that due to the internal uprising in some of the League's member states do not portend well for human rights nor in the context of the Arab League, at least for the foreseeable future. One issue that

has been long on the agenda of the Arab League is the reform of it is charter, including the promotion and protection of human rights as one of the objectives of the League of Arab states. However, decisions on this have been repeatedly delayed. 33

Conclusion:

The Arab League was an attempt to reflect and accommodate a popular and nationalistic Pan-Arab ideology. This formula, coupled with considerable challenges facing the organization since it is creation in 1945, meant high expectations with poor results. One may assume that either the League failed largely in operational terms, or it is also obvious political failure make it a failed organization. The failure of the Arab League to revitalize and modernize itself to generate a common Arab national security agenda is partly responsible for external influence and foreign intervention, which indeed undermines the League's role and limits it is effectiveness. The failure to recognize the diversity and polarity within and between member states from the beginning caused rifts and divisions among Arab states that hindered the Arab League's political development and it is operational effectiveness in conflict resolution. However, the frustrated, popular aspirations is unlikely to dissipate regardless of the direction and fate of the League, and that is perhaps the most profound meaning of the Arab revolution. Thus, the future role of the Arab League will have to be determined, as it was in it is creation, by popular momentum such as that one generated by the Arab uprising.

Inter-Arab relations played an important role in the creation and development of the Arab League. The polarizing underlying rivalry among the member states impacted the politics of the League and had a profound consequences for the structure, power and coherence of the Arab League as a regional organization. The divisions a among Arab countries, between rich states and poor ones, monarchs and republics, border disputes and historical rivalries have all been contributing factors to the slow progress of the implementation of military and security cooperation treaties. The presence of weak states and overlay are also reasons for this slow cooperation.

Review the activities of the Arab League illustrate a series of crucial features that appear to be deeply embedded in the Middle Eastern conflict-prevention and conflict resolution regime. First of all, it highlights, how the geographical fuzziness of the concept of Middle East and the presence of overlapping layers of ideological, ethnic and dynastic rivalries impact on the membership and mandates of this organization. The overlap between the conflict resolution and collective security mandates of this organization is possibly the most apparent consequence of these crisscrossing cleavages. However, there is a little evidence to suggest that the conflict resolution body of the organization has directly and systematically contributed to conflict resolution efforts. The dispositions included in the Arab League charter regarding the mandate of this organization to mediate in regional

conflicts have largely remained on paper, and in practice the official body of the League have often been bypassed by state summits and mediation missions. Yet the Arab League appears to be the institutional arrangement that has so far contributed most clearly to conflict resolution in the region. Meanwhile, the attribution of the erratic pattern of intervention of the Arab League to the fact that it was designed to fail appears at the same time self-evident and spurious. The organization is a Pan-Arab League in a region that is not exclusively Arab, also an area dominated by states consistently suspicious of Pan-Arabism or committed to use it as a strategic weapon in a struggle for power. Under certain circumstances, the organization succeeded in abating local crises and wars. Even if this analysis has shown that considering the Arab League as a failed organization, the League does need to undergo a drastic process of institutional reform. The gap between the 1945 Pact and the everyday life of the Arab League is widening. The biannual meetings that are now described as Arab League summits are not mentioned in the League Pact, and also some crucial dispositions included in the Pact have never been implemented while the symbolic and ideological value of the Arab League's Pact is undeniable, are form of the institutional structure of the League can and must take place in the near future. Additionally, the League should address the functional overlap between bodies such as the council, the political committee and the summit meetings, and formally reinforce the powers of the secretariat, where the position of secretary General is held by charismatic and respected figures, has proven to be a dynamic and effective body in mediating regional crises. The problem of enforcement may be due to a lack of common Arab well-power. The Arab League's history of boycotts and walkouts of the Arab League summits from the Arab leaders became a phenomenon. The most regional organizations are built upon the coalition of the willing. The League of Arab states would not reach this synergy because it is charter does not include a clause resolutions reached by member states. Although, the Arab League summits, the Arab leaders making decisions which are not acted upon. Thus, the concluding statements contained mottos signifying nothing. Therefore, the League's intense efforts concerning regional issues failed to craft a shared regional position. The complex set of ties between member states and outside actors with conflicting regional interests deprived the League of Arab states healthily functioning decision-making mechanisms, and hence, gave rise to suspicions the organization's resolutions were open to external influences. The difficult to tackle security aspect of regional conflicts necessitates different options including intervention and sanctions to be taken all the times. Given the Arab member states lacking of experience their organization's ability to unilaterally formulate policy proves rather limited. The Arab uprising adhering to democratic demands and safeguarding human rights that are unconventional for the League of Arab states. Indeed all Arab states are not governed by participatory political regimes render it challenging for the Arab League to

respond to cases of popular pro-democracy demonstrations in some states of the region. At this point, a need emerged for the organization to increase it is democratic experience as well.

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