

# **Curbing Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: Imperatives of Quadruple Action Package of Limited Military Response, Improved Social Services, Conflict Resolution Initiatives and Modified Pacifism**

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## **Abstract**

The objectives of this review paper are twofold. First is to examine activities and consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria over the past few years. The second objective is to recommend effective strategies anchored on peace and conflict resolution initiatives inclusive of pacifism to complement other measures towards ending Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This study adopts an all embracing and integrated perspective of terrorism. Such approach harnesses crucial elements or manifestations of terrorism contained in various definitions of the concept. The approach is very relevant to fuller understanding and comprehensive articulation of strategies for effective resolution of terrorism in the Nigerian social system. The paper highlighted the toll in people killed, seriously injured, disappeared or abducted, property loss or damages due to Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The paper also argued that strategies adopted by Government have recorded limited success because crucial elements like conflict resolution, improvements in social services, and pacifism were yet to be accorded optimum attention. On the contrary, military response considered as only slightly relevant in this paper, has been over emphasized in Nigeria's current response to seem to Boko Haram terrorist insurgence in her area. The paper emphasized that the war on terror is more than just the prevention of terrorist operations but must be comprehensive and promote cooperation that could attack the premise of terrorism and address the root causes, the enablers, and the operations. It recommended a quadruple action package involving limited military response, improved social services, conflict resolution initiatives and pacifism. The advantage of the package is that it has an obligation to provide not just security, but hope and progress without apprehensions of injustice and discrimination by parties involved in the initial conflict. In this context, people are empowered in a positive way within the social system and they contribute to make their nation work rather than embark protest terrorist activities.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, Insurgence, Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Pacifism, Boko Haram

## **Introduction**

Today's world is characterised by rising cases of violent crimes affecting many countries. The situation constitutes a very worrisome development to the global community.

Regrettably, **terrorism** has taken centre-stage in the global upsurge of violent crimes. Over the past decade, different forms of domestic and international terrorism have been witnessed around the world.

Nigeria on its part has been attacked severally by the revered Boko Haram terrorist group in the last three years with tremendous casualties. Indeed, the upsurge of terrorist activities in Nigeria has not only caught international attention, but has also exposed inherent conflict tradition that characterise intergroup social relationships in the country. Obiajulu (2011) observes that such conflict situations in Nigeria manifests as struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the opposing parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals. According to Eidelson & Eidelson, (2004), cited in Obiajulu (2011) conflict can be violent, silent or non-violent. Whereas use of physical force, violent uprising, and harassment as in armed conflicts characterize violent conflict situations; silent conflict is characterized by a social situation infested by a feeling of inequity, distrust, helplessness, superiority and inferiority syndrome.

In addition, Nigeria has also had a chequered history of conflict situations such as civil war, inter and intra ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts etc. Unfortunately, at the end of these calamities, Nigerians and particularly the government, do not commit adequate efforts to understand the causes of those conflict situations, douse all tensions, reconcile all parties and proffer lasting solutions. This is in order to avoid its recurrence. This failure, keeps fermenting and brewing grievances until it culminates to another violent scale.

The tendency of not getting to the root of conflict situations and fully resolving it is a major reason for emergence of social tensions which often degenerate to horrendous heights such as terrorism/insurgency (Premium Times, 2014). For instance, inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria that started in the North-Eastern region, dating back to about 1953 has dragged till date only changing in scope and intensity. Unfortunately, not much was done by the government in each case to end it effectively. Consequently, the Northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria has continued to experience rampant cases of ethno-religious conflict resulting in blood-letting and death of Nigerians. This situation has ultimately contributed in the springing up of the **Boko-Haram** terrorist sect, worst felt and still devastating the Northeast region of Nigeria.

The concept of terrorism has been approached or defined by scholars from diverse perspectives. However, irrespective of mode of conceptualization of terrorism, groups and individuals who carry out acts of terrorism often fall into either **traditional state-sponsored** or **non-state armed actors**.

Given enormous consequences arising from terrorism, its prevention and elimination requires a host of **traditional means** (policing, military, economic sanctions, intelligence) and **non-traditional means** (cultural, social and development initiatives including peace and conflict resolution options). Nigeria is currently applying some of the above mentioned strategies, but peace and conflict resolution option is yet to be adequately explored.

To this end, two major objectives are central to this review paper. First is to examine activities and consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria over the past five years. The second objective is to recommend effective strategies anchored on peace and conflict resolution initiatives inclusive of pacifism to complement other measures towards ending Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

### **Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorist Orientations and Insurgency**

The phenomenon of terrorism has lacked widely accepted definition. It is thus conceptualized differently by scholars over the years. To this end, Angus Martin (2003) maintained that the international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism. Jeffrey Record (2003) opined that for the US Army, about 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements

have been used. Laquer (2001) also recounted over 100 definitions and concluded that attempts to define terrorism by the United Nations encountered difficulties due to differences in opinion between various member states. The controversy is usually about the relevance of use of violence in the context of conflicts over national liberation. This deadlock has made it impossible to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism that incorporates a single, all-encompassing, legally-binding, criminal law definition of terrorism.

In his own reaction, Ruby (2002) argues that state actors in different climes use the concept of terrorism to refer to a wide variety of events, ranging from state oppression and killing of civilians, to shootings in public places by lone gunmen. Similarly, Victoroff (2005) concludes that terrorism is aggression against innocents, aimed largely at influencing a target audience to achieve essentially political goals.

On his part, Lizarrdo (2012) stressed the need to ignore mere abstract explanations to terrorism without focusing on the goals of such violent activities. To him, to do otherwise may obscure important variables that influence the development of terrorist groups and terrorist actions. In a similar disposition, Tilly (2004:5) added that a good definition of terrorism should be adapted from their goals which are to inflict, or spread a sense of terror or general psychological distress in their victims for politico-ideological purposes. He however cautions that focusing on the terror component alone as an essential feature of what actually defines terrorism may be theoretically misleading.

The United Nations General Assembly has condemned terrorist acts since 1994. She adopted a political description that has come to be finally accepted by some UN member countries to define terrorism. For the UN, terrorism refers to criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations; political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them (UN, 1994).

Irrespective of choice of definition, terrorism has frequently been described or associated with features such as outlaws, insurgency, violent crimes, conflicts, guerrilla warfare, organized crime, militancy, armed rebellion, extremism, deviants from rules and conventions, use of political violence etc

This study adopts an all embracing and integrated perspective of terrorism. Such approach harnesses crucial elements or manifestations of terrorism contained in various definitions of the concept as reviewed above. The approach is also relevant to fuller understanding and comprehensive articulation of strategies for effective resolution of the phenomenon of terrorism in any social system. An integrated approach to conceptualizing terrorism ensures that no essential terrorist aspect, actions, strategies, or types of non-state organizations that engage in terrorism and terrorist actors themselves is missed out. Notable longstanding local and regional conflicts linked to terror activities and violent crimes in some parts of the world include the Israeli-Palestinian, Iraqi, Afghan, Yemeni, Somali, Indian-Pakistani, Chechen, and most recently Nigeria and the Israeli-Gaza conflicts (Chiduluemije, 2014)

On the other hand, Crenshaw (1988) and Hoffman (1999) described the features of terrorist orientations. To them, a terrorist's ideological perspective provides a set of beliefs about the external world that not only foster an identity around commitment to a course, but also shape expectations about the rewards of terrorism and dictate the extent to which the terrorists' goals are dependent on the cooperation of the authorities. Terrorists see their role as one of an extreme martyr figure who, in making an honorable sacrifice, would expect to receive both social recognition and rewards in the afterlife (Silke, 2003). Accordingly, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder. This is reflected by an absence of empathy for the

suffering of others. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as “I am good and right. You are bad and wrong.” It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people. It is not the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone with low intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above average intelligence and have sophisticated ethical and moral development. A closed-minded certainty is a common feature of terrorist thinking (Merari 1990).

It is noteworthy that not all rebellions are insurgencies. Non-violent rebellions are known to use other strategies like civil resistance to achieve their goals. Recent examples are the revolution in Philippines around the 1980's which ousted President Marcos and the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized as such by other nations mostly-United Nations, whereas the other party taking part in such rebellion are not recognized.

The nature of insurgency emphasize the fact the rebels' course is illegitimate as is the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, there is also the possibility that those insurgents (Boko Haram group) see the authority itself as illegitimate. United Nations contended that an insurgency can be fought via counter-terrorism (counter-insurgency). There should be put in place, measures to protect the population as well as political and economic actions aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime.

### **Overview of the Role of 'Peace' and 'Creation of Peace-Building Platforms' in Nation States as Panacea for Sustainable Development**

The term peace refers to occurrence of harmony characterized by lack of violence, conflict behaviors and the freedom from fear of violence. It is commonly understood as the absence of hostility and retribution, and suggests sincere attempts at reconciliation, the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships. Peace also underscores prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all. Many terms have been associated with the concept of peace such as peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution etc.

Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peace-building happens before a conflict starts or once it ends. Peacekeeping prevents the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peace-building does. It also differs from peace-building in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begins. Furthermore, the perception of peacekeeping versus that of peace-enforcement is very different. Peace-enforcement requires more than just the perception of security, but also that of compassion and understanding. Peacekeeping operates under a simple premise, prevent violence. Peace-enforcement must maneuver itself and support restorative justice operations, contribute to the reconciliation process, support and protect the truth-commissions, etc

**Peace-building** is an approach or a set of interrelated efforts that support peace. It addresses the underlying causes of violence and works to create societal change. Although peace-building includes pre-conflict interventions, in practice most peace-building interventions are usually post-conflict interventions.

The UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee (2007), defined peace-building as a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. It is an intervention that is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace.

Peace-building includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national and international levels to address the root causes of

violence and ensure civilians have freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from humiliation before, during, and after violent conflict. The process of peace -building stabilizes society politically and socioeconomically.

There are two broad approaches to peace-building. First, peace-building can refer to *direct work* that intentionally focuses on addressing the factors driving or mitigating conflict. Here, there is an explicit attempt to reduce structural or direct conflict. Second, the term peace-building can also refer to efforts to coordinate a multi-level, multi-sectoral strategy, including ensuring that there is funding and proper communication and coordination mechanisms between humanitarian assistance, development, governance, security, justice and other sectors that may not use the term "peace-building" to describe themselves.

Peace-building efforts aim to manage, mitigate, resolve and transform central aspects of the conflict through official diplomacy as well as through civil society peace processes and informal dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. Peace-building addresses economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence. Peace-building efforts aim to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to transform the short and long term dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more stable, peaceful coexistence.

During the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating peace-building architecture based on Kofi Annan's previous proposals. She created UN Peace-building Commission in 2005; the UN Peace-building Support Office in 2005; and the UN Peace-building Fund in 2006. These three organizations enable the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peace-building efforts.

Nigeria as a conflict-ridden state stands to benefit from peace building models. Its underlying strategies should be effectively utilized in Nigeria's conflict situations and to fully resolve the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, to complement the goals of peace-building, Nigeria must adequately address social services, functional structures, emotional conditions, socio-political stability, rule of law etc

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study adopts Marxian brand of conflict theory with emphasis on class conflict as a theoretical platform. The major concepts of the theory include class divisions, power, exploitation, struggle, inequality, alienation. The key assumption of the theory is that society is made up of groups that have opposing interests. Coercion and attempts to gain power are ever-present aspects of human relations. According to Marx, societies are divided into classes with unequal resources. Since such marked inequalities exist, there are divisions of interest which are 'built into' the social system. Divisions also arise between racial groups or political factions. Thus, conflict or tension becomes a regular feature of society groups because of presence of antagonistic groups.

Against the above background, this study applies conflict theoretical framework to argue that:

1. Boko haram insurgency in Nigeria is offshoot of conflict within the ruling class generated by emerging divisions or political factions and conflicting interests.
2. The ruling class manipulates other social divisions like ethno-religious cleavages to pursue their economic and political interest.
3. The political class also takes advantage of inherent deprivation and poverty among peasant class to advance their interests. For instance, they use religious indoctrination and material inducements to mobilize members of the peasant class as foot soldiers of insurgency, in their struggle for political power. According to Ogunrotifa (2013), Mohammed Yusuf and his Boko Haram ideology found an echo and appeal within the rank of frustrated members of the peasant class in Northern

Nigeria. He capitalized on their dwindling economic situation and the 'Almajeri' system to attract large followership especially amongst the commoners (peasant class).

In view of above submissions, this study argues that attempts to fully understand and proffer solutions Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, must not relegate class conflict, particularly among the political elites and issues of widespread poverty especially in northern Nigeria to the background.

### **Historical Perspectives on Insurgency in Nigeria**

Insurgency is not new in Nigeria. The first known insurgency or terrorism attempt in Nigeria could be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro. On February 23, 1966, he declared the Niger Delta Republic and rebelled against the Federal Government. Their anger was on perceived exploitation and total disregard of the Niger/Delta region which is the major source of the nation's revenue.

Another case of insurgency in Nigeria was the attempt Biafrans to secede from Nigeria because of perceived marginalization. The group led by late Colonel Odimegwu Chukwuemeka Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra on 27th May, 1967. This action led to the Nigeria/Biafran war which Muzan (2014) described as the most brutal war witnessed in Africa.

More than thirty (30) years after the demise of Major Isaac Adaka Boro, there was a resurgence of the armed protest against both the federal government and the multinational companies engaged in oil exploration in the Niger Delta in the early 1990s. In the view of Osini (2013), the insurgency led by Ken Saro-Wiwa seem to decidedly unfocused as it targeted oil companies, the government and even the chieftains and their middle men.

After Ken Saro-Wiwa was killed it resulted into a full-fledged insurgency that led to the death of many people and loss of properties. The leaders of the resulting two groups- Ateke Tom and Alhaji Majaheed Asari Dokubo declared war on the federal government. The insurgency lasted for months before the then president, Olusegun Obasanjo used military force to silence majority of them. Finally, President Umaru Musa Yaradua employed dialogue and granted amnesty to the militants to arrest the situation (Allswell 2000).

The latest insurgency in Nigeria is the Jama'atu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram. It is without doubt, the most sophisticated and complex insurgency Nigeria has ever experienced. Boko Haram has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity in Nigeria.

### **Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: Background Issues, Violent Attacks and their Effects on Nigerians**

When Nigeria was amalgamated in 1914, the North and the newly created Country then had been largely Muslim (with a pagan minority) for centuries whereas the South was mostly animist. However most of these ancestral beliefs were supplanted by the Christian faith in the south in the decades to come. This difference came to be associated with resultant religious conflicts in Nigeria which was first recorded in 1953 during a religious riot in the Northern city of Kano followed by the 1980s upsurge in violence due to the death of Mohammed Marwa "Maitatsine". In the same decade, the erstwhile military ruler of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida enrolled Nigeria in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) at a Conference. This very much aggravated religious tensions in the country mostly among the Christian community.

However, following the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, 'Sharia'(an Islamic legal framework) was instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in Muslim-plurality state of Zamfara. Other Muslim-plurality states followed the Zamfara example in a push for

the institution of Sharia legal principles at the state level of government. The sharia system brought about controversy as to the would-be legal status of the non-Muslims in the sharia system. This culminated in a spate of Muslim-Christian riots that emerged and continued till date but merely changing in rate and scope.

Deprivation, inequality and the increasingly radical nature of Islam both locally and internationally are contributory to earlier religious violence such as; the foremost Kano riot of 1953 and 1980. Also, the military crackdown on Maitatsine, a renowned Moslem sect leader increased the occurrence of violence in Nigeria which spread across northern cities over the course of the next 20 years. Examples include; the Maitatsine riot, the Zagon-Kataf crises of 1992, Jos riot of 2002 and 2008 and ultimately the Boko Haram insurgence that has gone unabated since 2009.

The Boko Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist group advocating strict Sharia law and opposing the westernizing of Nigerian society which accounts for the name 'Boko Haram' meaning 'Western Education is forbidden'. Yusuf used existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala society, a popular conservative Islamic sect originally welcomed into government to recruit members before breaking away to form his own faction.. However, the sect initially operated in a quietist nature, conducting its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. They then withdrew from society into remote north-eastern areas but were soon to change into a Salafist-Jihadi group known for terrorist attacks since 2009 with political goal of creating an Islamic state.

Also in 2009, due to Boko Haram extremist motives and increasingly militant character of the sect, government directed the police and military to begin investigation into the sects' affairs in an assignment code-named 'Operation Flush'. On 26<sup>th</sup> July 2009, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members, confiscated weapons and bomb making devices. This culminated in revenge attacks on police during a funeral procession and widespread riot which lasted till 30<sup>th</sup> July 2009 with more than 700 people, mostly Boko Haram members losing their lives. Also police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches were destroyed. Yusuf was arrested and later died in custody while trying to escape. He was succeeded by his second-in-command Abubakar Shekau.

The activities of Boko Haram sect took a new dimension after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, their founder and leader. His death marked the beginning of the worst era of terrorism ever to be recorded in Nigerian history (Classified Cable, US Embassy Abuja-1999). According to Alhaji Dibal, the Al Qaida, Islamic Sect in the Egyptian Maghreb has ties with Boko Haram. They have in the last half decade or so; become the most dangerous insurgent group that Nigerians have witnessed. They are known to destructively attack churches, mosques, schools, police stations and government, international agencies, motor parks, market squares and other highly populated places, private and public owned facilities with a kind of guerrilla warfare tactics. (Sahara Reporter, April 21, 2014).

The group's weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degree of lethal capacity. The activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria have brought about insecurity, state of emergency, loss of lives and properties, etc.

#### **Outline of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria since 2009**

Date (Timeline of Attack Incidents)	Place, Nature and Casualties
7th September, 2010	Bauchi prison break where Boko Haram freed 700 prisoners
31 <sup>st</sup> December, 2010	December 2010 Abuja Attack
12 <sup>th</sup> March, 2011	Muslim Cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi assassinated for criticizing the violent groups in Northeast Nigeria
22th April, 2011	Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State

29 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	May 2011 Northern Nigeria bombings
16 <sup>th</sup> June, 2011	Boko Haram claims responsibility for the 2011 Abjua Police Head Quarters Bombing.
26 <sup>th</sup> June, 2011	Bombing attack on a beer garden in Maidujuri leaving 25 dead and 12 injured
10 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
11 <sup>th</sup> July, 2011	The University of Maidujuri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns.
12 <sup>th</sup> August, 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bama was shot dead by Boko Haram.
26 <sup>th</sup> August, 2011	2001 Abuja Bombing
4 <sup>th</sup> November, 2011	2011 Dematuru attacks
25 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	December 2011 Nigeria Bombings
5-6 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	January 2012 Nigeria attacks
20 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	January 2012 Kano Bombings
28 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Nigerian Army says it killed 11 Boko Haram insurgents
8 <sup>th</sup> February, 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the Army Head Quarter in Kaduna
16 <sup>th</sup> February, 2012	Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed
8 <sup>th</sup> March, 2012	During a British Hostage Rescue attempt to free Italian Engineer Franco Lamolinera and British Christopher Mmcances, abducted in 2011 by a splinter Boko Haram group, both hostages were killed
31 <sup>st</sup> May, 2012	During a Joint Task Force (JTF) raid on a Boko Haram dens it was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage were killed.
3 <sup>rd</sup> June, 2012	15 church members were killed and several others injured in church bombing in Bauchi. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesman Abu Qaqa
17 <sup>th</sup> June, 2012	Suicide Bombers strike three churches in Kaduna. At least 50 people were killed
17 <sup>th</sup> June, 2012	130 bodies were found in Plateau state. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram Terrorists.
18 <sup>th</sup> September, 2012	Family of four murdered
18 <sup>th</sup> September, 2012	Murder of six at an outdoor party
19 <sup>th</sup> September, 2012	Nigerian Military arrests Boko Haram militants, reported death of Abu Qaqa
3 <sup>rd</sup> October, 2012	Around 25-46 people were massacred in the town of Miebi in Adamawa, Nigeria during a night time raid.
18 <sup>th</sup> March, 2013	2013 Knao Bus bombing; at least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station
19 <sup>th</sup> April, 2013	Deadliest attack since 2009: gun battle with security forces leaves 260 dead and nearly 1000 injured in
7 <sup>th</sup> May, 2013	At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks in army barracks, prison and police post in Bama town
6 <sup>th</sup> July, 2013	Yobe State school shooting: 42 people mostly students were killed in a school attack in North East Nigeria
29 September, 2013	College of Agriculture in Gujba: 40 male students killed
14 <sup>th</sup> January, 2014	At least 31 people killed, over 50 people injured by suicide bombing in Maiduguri, Borno State
16 <sup>th</sup> February, 2014	Izghe massacre: 106 killed
25 <sup>th</sup> February, 2014	Federal Government College attack: Fury at military over Yobe death at least 29 teenage boys dead at Federal Government Collage Buru Yadi

14 <sup>th</sup> April, 2014	2014 Chibok kidnapping: Government properties including the only girls' secondary school attacked. At least 16 killed or missing and 234 female students kidnapped. The Boko Haram militants said it would treat the assaults
14 <sup>th</sup> April, 2014	April 2014 Abuja bombing: two bombs explode at a crowded bus station in Abuja, Nigeria, killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200
1 <sup>st</sup> May, 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same area of Abuja as the April bomb
5 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	2014 Gamburu attack: Boko Haram attacked the towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State, Nigeria. They started shooting in a busy market place, set houses on fire and gunned down anyone who tried to flee. The death toll of the massacre has been set as high as 336
13 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa: Boko Haram attacked the three villages, killing around 60 people in Manane; Vigilantes fought back, killing over 20 Boko Haram militants
17 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	Paris Summit: the summit in Paris has declared Boko Haram is pas of al-Qaeda as leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group that is hiding more than 200 school girls hostage in a dense jungle. Western nations have pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists
18 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	Kano: suicide car bomb kills five people
20 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	Jos: Twin bomb explosions kill 118 people
30 <sup>th</sup> May, 2014	Assassination of Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timta the Emir of Gwoza in Borno
1 <sup>st</sup> June, 2014	Mubi bombing: An attack at a football field in Miebi, Adamawa killing at least 40 people
2 <sup>nd</sup> June, 2014	Men dressed as soldiers slaughtered at least 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza. A community leader who witnessed the killings said that local residents had pleaded for help from the military, but it did not arrive in time. It took a few days for word from survivors to reach the provincial capital of Maiduguri, because the roads are extremely dangerous and phone connections are poor or non-existent
29 <sup>th</sup> May-June 5 <sup>th</sup> 2014	6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military; 20 women and 3 men abducted 60 Boko Haram killed by Cameroon's military
6 <sup>th</sup> June – 12 <sup>th</sup> June, 2014	4 attacks, killing 5 civilians, 6 military; military kill 50 Boko Haram
13 <sup>th</sup> June – 19 <sup>th</sup> June, 2014	2 attacks, 93 civilian killed, 8 Boko Haram killed by Borno Vigilante government
20 <sup>th</sup> June – 26 <sup>th</sup> June, 2014	4 attacks, 93 civilian killed, 60 abducted. A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counter attack; 25 Boko Haram and 16 soldiers killed in attack on military base. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border
27 <sup>th</sup> – 26 <sup>th</sup> June, 2014	2 attacks, 112 killed
4 <sup>th</sup> July – 10 <sup>th</sup> July, 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed. 53 Boko Haram were killed while capturing a military base and police station in Borno on the 4 <sup>th</sup> of July. On the 6 <sup>th</sup> , soldiers killed a Boko Haram kenppin and his brother at their home in Kiduna; also on the 6 <sup>th</sup> , 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno

11 <sup>th</sup> June- 17 July, 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed many of these slot by fighter jet in a failed counter-attack. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed on July 16 in Adamawa, presumably by Boko Haram
25 <sup>th</sup> July – 27 <sup>th</sup> July, 2014	2 attacks in Kolofata, Cameroon, including the kidnapping of the wife of the Vice Prime Minister, Amadau Ali, as well as local religious leader and mayor, Seini Boukar-Lamine
11 <sup>th</sup> August, 2014	28 civilians killed, 97 kidnapped, all men and boys, in attacks on villages in Borno State in rural Northeast Nigeria. Many homes torched in the raid.

Culled from Classified Cable Source, US Embassy Abuja, August 2014

## **Recommendations on the Quadruple Action Package for Curbing Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria**

### **(a) Relevant Peace and Conflict Resolution Strategies to be Fully Exploited / Adopted for Curbing Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria**

**Conflict Resolution** is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict situations and retribution. It does not include some components of peace-building, such as state building and socioeconomic development. Best (2007) emphasized that scholars on conflict studies should appreciate that; every conflict has a specific context, history and background which deserves to be appreciated in resolving the conflict situation.

Oftentimes, conflict resolution aim at finding the *win-win* solution, or mutually satisfying standpoint for everyone involved (Fisher and Ury (1981). Nonetheless, achieving such compromise can be very difficult. Furthermore direct communication between disputants that explicitly addresses issues at stake in the conflict can be perceived as very rude, making the conflict worse and delaying resolution. Involving religious, tribal or community leaders: communicating indirectly through a third party and making suggestions through stories (see Vinod Swami, 1992) are some useful options in conflict resolution. Other strategies of conflict resolution are arbitration, adjudication, mediation, negotiation, conflict suppression, conflict management, traditional approach, realism. These strategies are fully discussed below as we examine their relevance to proffering lasting solution to Boko Haram terrorist insurgence in Nigeria.

The role of conflict resolution initiatives in resolving terrorist challenges cannot be over emphasized. This is why, Hayes et al (2003) contended that those who oppose terrorism should endeavour to engage in a broader set of dispute resolution strategies to ascertain the one workable and thus use it. Furthermore, Harik (2004) observed that there have been many occasions in which governments and others engaged in conflict resolution strategies with terrorists including amnesties, treatment of arrested terrorists, and negotiations during terrorist events and campaigns etc. All these justify that conflict resolution can be an important tool in fighting terrorism even in Nigeria.

In contemplating solutions to terrorist activities, Hayes et al (2003) divided terrorists into **absolute** and **traditional forms**. The absolute types are not willing to enter into political discourse. Their demands are immediate, unconditional, and universal, often using suicide attacks to draw attention to their issues. In contrast are traditional terrorists who focus on more specific ethnic and ideological courses, such as changing a specific political structure in a particular location.

This distinction suggests that there are two general approaches to the issue of dispute resolution with terrorists. For absolute terrorists, the leaders are generally hidden and unknown, while tangible goals are unclear. The situation makes **direct** negotiations infeasible. This is truly the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Notwithstanding that Boko Haram terrorist insurgence in Nigeria is a typical example of absolute terrorism with hidden leaders and unclear objectives, it must be emphasized that majority of appropriate strategies for responding to terrorism is non-violent. Over bearing application of force is a less useful element in the approach. Force is only relevant in two instances and is intended to provide peaceful atmosphere needed for talks or conflict resolution to proceed and achieve result (Ruby et al, 2002). The first situation that may require application force is during initial stages of peacekeeping where force helps to achieve or allows for a cooling off period to occur to start the rest of the strategic conflict resolution processes. The second is during the implementation of peace-enforcement processes. Outside the two scenarios, force is mostly counter-productive as an instrument against terrorist groups.

It is in the light of foregoing and the fact that prospects of resolving Boko Haram terrorist insurgence in Nigeria are bright if appropriate, effective, and broader set of conflict resolution strategies as recommended below are applied. Such conflict resolution options will stimulate much desired peace and put Nigeria back on the path of socio-economic development.

**Role of Negotiation and Mediation:** Best {2007:105} defined negotiation as a direct process of dialogue and discussion taking place at least between two parties who are faced with a conflict situation or dispute . The aim is for the two parties to reach an agreement on the sources of conflict between them. Roger fisher, who is associated with this mode of conflict resolution, introduced the term *principled negotiation* as a component of conflict resolution. The principle advocated for interest-based negotiation that should result in showing empathy to each other.

Best (2007) defined **mediation** as informal and non-binding process undertaken by an external party that fosters the settlement of demands of different parties to a dispute. Mediation is usually associated with the emergence of a third party. It is supposed to be a voluntary process. Mediation usually involves dialogue aimed at helping parties to dispute reach a solution to their problems. The mediator is expected to help the parties by creating the enabling environment for dialogue between them to prevail.

Despite its advantages, Joshua Weiss (2003) notes that the negotiation option for dealing with terrorists is often viewed as a weak option or a compromise. He further expressed doubts that negotiation with terrorist groups could be done properly since absolute terrorists refuse to be known but rather remain faceless. On his part, Best (2007) warns that there is a risk that negotiation with terrorists or mediation by a third party might inadvertently justify their actions and/or provide false legitimacy. Negotiation and mediation moves with terrorist groups are also considered ineffective because terrorist organizations exist and operate both domestically and internationally. It is too narrow to view resolution with just allied group members in a locality as the best solution. Often too, there are technical/practical problems related to negotiation with terrorists because their organizations can be structured in a manner that can make it hard to physically locate them, identify the leadership, and then transmit messages to them.

The position of this paper is that it is wrong to view negotiation, mediation, and dialogue with terrorist groups like Boko Haram as a sign of weakness or compromise. Refusing to talk with them (terrorists) and over reliance on military force are defective responses which has often escalated conflicts. It is important to emphasize that all terrorist activities are founded on real or imagined grievances, demands, or deprivations. Dialogue not only provides opportunity to fully understand the basis of the terrorism but also conveys a sense of achievement on the part of the terrorist group that they have successfully drawn attention of the state to their plight. The news that Boko Haram group in Nigeria asked government to exchange her members in detention with Chibok girls they abducted is an

indication that they are ready to negotiate. Thus, negotiation should not be completely ignored as an approach to resolving contending issues.

**Arbitration Option:** It involves use of a supposedly neutral third person to resolve a conflict situation. The parties to a dispute can be involved in deciding the arbitrator. The third party usually listens to the parties position statements, weighs the evidences presented, before handing down their decision. Such decisions are expected to be binding on the parties to the dispute. The fact that Boko Haram terrorist group are faceless does not make this strategy inapplicable as some people erroneously contend. Effort should be sustained toward identifying leaders of the group. Such leaders shall be presented the olive branch of peace and encouraged to choose an arbitrator they can trust who will preside over the resolution of the matter.

**Adjudication Option:** According to Obiajulu (2011), adjudication involves the use of courts and other litigation processes. He added that courts vary according to their levels of jurisdiction. Parties to a dispute are usually represented by their counsels. The court is usually briefed by the counsel to the parties in dispute. Evidences are usually taken which are important in determining the facts of the matter. Court ruling on the issue(s) in dispute is binding on parties. Appeals can be made to a higher court. Judicial decisions are usually enforced

.Although the fact that Boko Haram leaders and membership have remained faceless and unknown makes it difficult for the group to be summoned, arbitration is still a relevant tool. In this regard, members of Boko Haram arrested for involvement in their nefarious activities should be charged to courts of appropriate jurisdiction and allowed access to counsel of their choice. That way, some of their grievances, demands and possible pacifiers may be uncovered. Furthermore, public enlightenment on need to take matters against the government to law courts for adjudication should be stepped up while costs of litigation are minimized. All these will make adjudication an attractive and feasible option both to government and aggrieved groups.

**Shift of emphasis from Conflict Suppression and Realism to Conflict Management:** Conflict suppression is using instruments of suppression (police, army, local vigilante, taskforce, thugs etc) to quell or push issues precipitating conflict under the carpet. Oftentimes, solutions that are not sustainable and shared by other parties are imposed. It is indeed a conflict resolution method that is both wrong and strong. It is suggestive of unequal social relationship between parties in conflict. It usually leads to protracted conflict because of its spillover effects and reprisal attacks. Similarly, **realism** is based on coercion or use of force to resolve conflict. It includes both violent and non violent methods of coercion like war and diplomacy. It is usually a win-lose situation (Obiajulu, 2011).

On the other hand, conflict management represents a proactive measure aimed at nipping conflict in bud. It is about ensuring that the society, using available cultural mechanisms, does not allow conflict to escalate to the point of consuming people (Obiajulu, 2011). As an inevitable aspect of human life, conflict management strategies include conflict limitation, containment and litigation.

Although conflict management strategy is mostly applied in pre-conflict situations when people and property are not yet consumed, it is still very relevant in the current Boko Haram terrorist insurgence in Nigeria. This is particularly important because conflict suppression measures applied by the Nigerian Government through military Joint Task Force (JTF), has been minimally effective and far from enthroning peaceful coexistence in the areas. Killing Boko Haram terrorists through JTF attacks have been used as major counterterrorism strategy with obvious side effects. Such side effects include counter attacks by the group upon unsuspecting villages. More worrisome is the fact that recruitment or membership of Boko Haram group appears to be on the rise despite the attacks. Thus conflict management initiatives will be very useful in ending the flow of new recruits and resolving various local

and regional issues linked to terrorism because terror exists to create opposition. Furthermore, US Embassy Records (2001), noted that a measure of conflict suppression has been recorded to work in Western Countries with formidable Intelligence and Military Apparatus, but often failed in pluralist ethnic, religious or cultural orientations.

### **(b) Use of military force**

Over bearing application of force is a less useful element in fighting terrorism. Force is only relevant in two instances and is intended to provide peaceful atmosphere needed for talks or conflict resolution to proceed and achieve result (Ruby et al, 2002). The first situation that may require application force is during initial stages of peacekeeping where force helps to achieve or allows for a cooling off period to occur before the start of the rest of strategic conflict resolution processes. The second is during the implementation of peace-enforcement processes. Outside the two scenarios, force is mostly counter-productive as an instrument against terrorist groups. Above all, there must be strict adherence to applicable rules of engagement in situations where military force is used. The timeframe for military action must not be protracted to reduce casualties (especially on the part of terrorist group) which might negatively affect their appetite for peace talks.

### **(c) Government Attendance to Social Services /Infrastructure Issues**

Nigeria must adequately address social services, functional structures, socio-political stability, rule of law, good governance, poverty, corruption, and all forms of religious intolerance etc. Indeed, good governance should be the rule rather than the exception. Appropriate power should be exercised in the management of the country's economic and social resources for development. Also the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and to respect citizens should not be in doubt. Government must address root causes of insurgency rather than being mere relational in approach. Attention must shift beyond temporal solutions because none of them has capacity to end insurgency in Nigeria. Alemika (2004), frowned at the disconnection between the governed and the government in Nigeria he lamented that some manifestations of the crisis of the state and governance in the country are inability to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that accord with human dignity for the majority of the citizens.

### **(d) The Unique and Crucial Role of Pacifism**

Against the background of foregoing peace and conflict resolution strategies advocated, vis-à-vis their weaknesses as identified, the strategy of **Pacifism** is strongly canvassed as an option that will complement those peace and conflict resolution initiatives as well as military actions that are conducted in extreme obedience to applicable rules of engagement. This triple approach constitutes a most feasible means to end the conflict situation in Nigeria.

Pacifism in its purest form categorically opposes application of any forms of war or violence as means of settling disputes. This strategy is not popular globally, as a means of conflict or dispute resolution due to erroneous belief that it is a sign of weakness on the part of the recognized individual or sovereign state that applies it. Yet it is adjudged as a very effective strategy given impressive results that Ghandi achieved with it in India. It is worthy of note that Ghandi's vision of a free India based on religious pluralism was challenged in the early 1940s by a new Muslim nationalism which was demanded a separate Muslim homeland carved out of India. The demand gave rise to religious violence in the Punjab and Bengal areas of India, similar to the current Boko Haram insurgence Nigeria. Yet this tactic of conflict resolution (pacifism) applied by Ghandi conquered the violence..

Pacifism covers a spectrum of views ranging from the belief that international disputes can and should be peacefully resolved; to calls for the abolition of institutions of the military

and war; to opposition to any organization of society through governmental force (anarchist or libertarian pacifism); to rejection of the use of physical violence to obtain political, economic or social goals; to opposition to violence under any circumstance, including defense of self and others. The philosophy or strategy of pacifism sees means and ends as inseparable. By implication, it is contradictory to try to use violence to obtain peace. Principled pacifism also holds that violence of any form is an inappropriate response to conflict, and is morally wrong. Pragmatic pacifism holds that the costs of war and inter-personal violence are so substantial that better ways of resolving disputes must be found.

The modified pacifist approach being canvassed in this paper involve reliance on peacemaking and peace-building premise in post military operation situations which should go hand in hand with peace and conflict resolution strategies earlier enumerated. However, before the Government lays down all arms to fully shun violence and embrace only peace moves, Barnett *et al* advocated that efforts should be made to ensure that all the guiding principles are in place viz; stabilizing the post-conflict zones (in this case, the North-east geopolitical zone), restoring state institutions and dealing with social, economic and religious issues that triggered the conflict. This entails the need of gathering all the elder statesmen, elites, religious and traditional rulers in the zone and ensures their full participation in the settlement process. The role of such people is important not only in calling youths who are fraternizing with Boko Haram to order but also in the implementation of peace-enforcement strategies generated via pacifism.

Pacifism is deemed as having the greatest possibility of succeeding, but should this strategy of dispute/peace resolution fail; the next option should be for Nigerian government to seek the support of United Nations (UN). Approaching the UN for assistance is in recognition of her aims to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achieving world peace. Interestingly, Agenda 6 of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution, pledges to take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions as approved by the Security Council. The UN may if request is made from Nigeria, consider sending peacekeepers to her Northeast region where Boko Haram armed conflict has been most devastating to enforce terms of peace agreements and to discourage combatants from resuming hostilities in the future.

## Conclusions

The war on terror is more than just the prevention of terrorist operations. It is usually comprehensive in nature, attacking the premise of terrorism itself, addressing the root causes, the enablers, and the operations. Combating terrorism is as much about promoting cooperation as it is countering extra-legal violent actions of terrorist groups or insurgents. The strategy has an obligation to provide not just security, but hope and progress without apprehensions of injustice and discrimination on the part of parties involved in the initial conflict. This is why sole adoption of 'might is right' strategy rarely achieve meaningful results. Therefore, this paper has strongly advocated for tools of conflict resolution for it is within this process that the war on terror, and terrorism itself, can be won.

No country can make meaningful progress in any aspect of their socio-economic and political life while consistently fighting terrorism in her area. No developmental project or investment can thrive in such atmosphere of conflict. The Boko Haram terrorist insurgency in Nigerian has done too much harm in the past six years of its violent activities in Nigeria. The loss of lives, loss of government owned and private property, failure of sustainable development initiatives by well meaning Nigerians and Government, loss of prospective foreign investments are a few of the fallouts of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria etc.

All hands must be on deck therefore in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria irrespective of diverse social, political, ethnic, religious or cultural inclination of Nigerians.

This is because when all Government institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations, Community Based and Cultural Organizations, political and religious leaders, stakeholders and individuals jointly work in liaison, the scourge of Boko Haram insurgence will be effectively resolved.

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