

# The agent's desire at Game Theory: from being to having

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*“In the opening words of his **Principles**, Alfred Marshall proclaimed economics to be a psychological science”*

(Simon, 1978, p. 343)

## **Abstract**

This paper begins by discussing the homo economicus, economic agent from neoclassical theory, which is part of mainstream economics, coming from the Cartesian subject of physics in the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth century arises the Game Theory, which is also part of the mainstream economics, where the epistemological object differs from the Cartesian object, for dealing with the relationship between the "ego" and the "other". Taking as an example the game of the scorpion and the frog, it is shown that there are two agents, explained by psychoanalysis as the neurotic and the perverse. These agents are rational but driven by different desires, and therefore the Hegelian-Lacanian subject proposed by Faveret (2014) for Game Theory generalizes the Cartesian subject, also lending to the agent a psychic history. This paper shows how the unconscious desire develops in the brain-mind, leading to the replacement of being the experience of emotions, into having in the world of objects. As a novel hypothesis it is proposed that the unconscious is not what commands the "ego" deterministically, but the part of the brain-mind that turns emotions into rational symbolic behavior.

**Key words:** Game Theory; economic agent; psyche.

## 1. Introduction

The first question when considering any science is epistemological. What is the object to be analyzed, and who is the subject that examines it? In the case of social sciences, the object is a human being that lives in society, and therefore the subject must analyze himself.

*In this regard, it is necessary to remember two significant factors: on one hand, we have the inevitable overlapping of subject and object in psychology and other social sciences – the subject which knows, is, in these areas, the human being, which at the same time constitutes his own object of study. Therefore is not possible to establish clear and rigid limits between these two fields, what enhances the complexity of these studies (Ferreira, 2008, p. 36).*

In economics this subject-object that builds relationships of exchange and production is called economic agent. Ultimately, as Marshall said, the work to characterize the agent is somehow a psychology, although only more recently, economic psychologists have been influencing economic science, especially in the area known as behavioral economics.

The economic agent from neoclassical economics, which is part of the mainstream, is the homo economicus, which relies "on an obvious psychological law, that could be described as the universal preference for greater gains, as opposed to smaller gains" (Ferreira, 2008, p. 56). The economic definition of the agent as someone who maximizes utility constrained by his income, works in terms of the first topic of Freudian theory, as the pleasure principle in face of the reality principle, what was perceived by the psychologist Nivea Melo. So in psychic terms, the homo economicus is necessary, but not sufficient, because this is only the beginning of Freudian psychic theory.

As can be seen, under this definition of the nineteenth century, neoclassical economics becomes quantifiable, which was highly desirable to characterize economics as a mathematical science, following the model of physics, the first of sciences. Moreover, the homo economicus is rational, having full information, which he uses to maximize his utility (sometimes taken as satisfaction) to choose according to his preferences, that are consistent and stable over time.

The homo economicus is an agent that comes from the philosophical system of Descartes, individualistic and rational, whose emphasis is on thinking to discover the truth of the object, where again one can see the physical science as inspiration. Later arises, however, Game Theory, which was incorporated into the mainstream of economics. Their creators had perceived this theory as a new model for the economy.

*In their book *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944), Von Neumann and Morgenstern asserted that the mathematics developed for the physical sciences, which describes the workings of a disinterested nature, was a poor model for economics. They observed that economics is much like a game, wherein players anticipate each other's moves, and therefore requires a new kind of mathematics, which they called game theory. (The name may be somewhat of a misnomer — game theory generally does not share the fun or frivolity associated with games) (Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2012, "game theory" entry).*

What Von Neumann and Morgenstern did not realized, perhaps because the emphasis on non-cooperative games arose later with John Nash, is that Game Theory, putting into focus the relationship between the "ego" and the "other" and including confrontation and domination, could constitute a change in the philosophic paradigm. That is, a subject psychologically characterized changed to a subject psychoanalytically characterized. The

difference between psychoanalysis and psychology is that the first builds a model of the internal work of the mind, based on the unconscious, while the psychology externally typifies the psychic behavior in a given situation of interest.

A game of Game Theory which places the theory in close contact with psychoanalytic theory is the 'scorpion and the frog' shown in Figure 1. On the right are the gains of the frog and the scorpion in each strategy. In this game the scorpion asks the frog to transport him across the river, and deceives the frog, saying that he will not sting or he would die by drowning. But he was lying and they died. The frog chooses first and as he is deceived by the lie, believes that the first result is (-10, 2), in which case the scorpion would choose the second result (5, 3), and all would be well. But the first result is actually (-10, 5) which is the largest gain for the scorpion. The scorpion chooses after the frog, and he prefers to die than stop stinging the frog, as this is his true nature.




Figure 1 – The scorpion and the frog

Source: (Varian, 2006, p. 575)

In Varian (2006), where strategic interactions between agents are treated, the comment is that if the frog was smart, he should have tied the tail of the scorpion, or hired a killer frog, threatening to kill the family of the scorpion if he stings the frog. The idea would be to change the gains of the scorpion, so that he would not sting the frog. Note that the proposed solutions are far from the kind of action possible to the homo economicus, like the symbolic castration of the scorpion, as the chemical castration that is done to a pedophile in the USA, and the threat of the frog to take revenge post-mortem on the scorpion, through collusion with an avenging frog.

The important lesson of this fable, which actually comes from humans, not animals, is not about the murder. Is that the agents of this game, the scorpion and the frog, have different basic characters, immediately placing Game Theory on the field of psychoanalysis. The frog is a neurotic agent who tries to please the scorpion, carrying him without gaining anything in return, probably for having a harsh or unloving father, and unconsciously designs his father in the scorpion.

The scorpion is a perverse agent (which wants to impose his own law), driven in the fable by the death drive (which takes someone destructively back to an inorganic state), which places the agent in a torsion of jouissance (Maurano, 2011), i.e., a perverse jouissance in the

embrace of death, which happens in the fusion between the scorpion and the frog (the jouissance is the first psychic state of the newborn, merging with the breastfeeding mother).

Thus, in the Game Theory may exist more than one type of agent, and the relationships among these include confrontation, domination, collusions, perversion of the law in the form of lies, beyond crime and punishment, as in the threat of murder that the frog could do for take revenge. In Faveret (2014), it is shown that these types of human interactions have noticeable economic importance in the tax evasion, which is a game of prisoner's dilemma type (Schelling, 1973) apud (Axelrod, 2006, p. 133).

## **2. The Lacanian Psychism**

This paper adopts Lacan psychoanalytic line, though with references of Bion, Jung, Klein, Wallon and Winnicott. Lacan made a big effort to theoretically characterize psychoanalysis as a science, based on the Freudian teaching, and approaching it to various other disciplines, such as philosophy (including Hegel), anthropology, mathematics, logic, also covering the construction of algorithms.

To describe the psychoanalytic theory of the mind, the development of the child will be followed until about five years old, a period in that the formation of the unconscious begins and ends. The Freudian unconscious in this paper is understood not as the place of irrationality that commands human beings with their unknowing, but as the mental link between emotions and rationality, which are in different places in the brain.

The main reason why psychoanalysis did not realize that the function of the unconscious is to turn emotions into rational behavior is that psychoanalytic theory emerged gradually as a therapy to care for mental disorders, beginning with hysteria, and not as a complete theory of the psyche. There are several conceptual lines about psychic treatment, and only the superposition of them could provide an integrated psychoanalytic theory.

*An investigation of stable, normal states, in which the boundaries of the ego are safeguarded against the id through resistances (anticathexes) and can withstand strongly, and in which the superego is not distinguished from the ego, by working together harmoniously - an investigation of this kind would teach us little. The only thing that can help us are the states of conflict and turmoil, when the contents of the unconscious id have perspective to force a way for the ego, and the conscience and the ego once more are on the defensive against this invasion. It is only under these conditions that observations can be made, to correct or confirm our statements about the two partners. Thus, our night time sleep is precisely such a state, and, therefore, the psychic activity during sleep, which we perceive as dreams, is our more favorable object of study (Freud, 1974, p. 117).*

It is also argued in this paper that the unconscious is like a Windows operational system of a computer, making the link between the hardware of the brain, and the utilities software of the conscious mind, such as Word and Excel, which would be the rationality of humans. The first step, then, is to understand how the brain structure is formed.

### **2.1 The Brain Formation**

According to the triune brain theory (MacLean, 1990, pp. 8-18), the human brain evolved in three layers, with the oldest being the reptilian (R-complex), followed by the old-mammals' layer (limbic system), and by the new-mammals' layer (neocortex), like three interconnected biological computers. According to Sagan (1983, p. 41), "MacLean has shown

that the R-complex plays an important role at aggressive behavior, at territorial demarcation and at the establishment of social hierarchy."

Already the limbic system is linked particularly to emotions, while the neocortex is involved with problem solving, learning, and memory details. "In humans, the neocortex is about eighty-five percent of the brain" (ibidem). Possibly, one of the latest evolutionary acquisitions of the neocortex was the frontal lobes (the high forehead of humans) that control inter alia, the prediction of the future. "In the real sense, civilization can be the product of the frontal lobes" (ibidem, p. 49).

An important aspect with regard to the human brain, which is closely akin to the construction of the unconscious mind, is that the human being has a very large brain, which is incomplete at the newborn, because otherwise it would be very difficult to pass the head of the baby through the mother's vaginal channel. This incomplete brain leads to the baby lack of motor coordination, resulting in that the child goes through a long period of helplessness and dependence, till five years old. In this period occur simultaneously the final completion of the brain, and the formation of the unconscious mind, which are a hallmark of the human species.

Thus, a hypothesis of this paper is that the unconscious mind works like a basic operational system like Windows, which is recorded in the brain as a Read-Only Memory (ROM). This basic programming filters the aggressiveness of the R-complex through the emotions of the limbic system, transforming them into symbolic and rational behavior of the neocortex, which is the last part of the brain to mature. Later, during the rest of life, the conscious mind (the rationality of the neocortex) will work as a Random Access Memory (RAM), which can be read and written, and often it is not realized that the unconscious mind, pre-recorded in ROM, is also in operation.

Depending on social conditions in which this ROM memory recording was made, which comes from the speech, the person gains a basic character named by psychoanalysis as psychotic, perverse, neurotic or normal. That is why although the evils of the unconscious mind predominantly comes from a social origin, they also may require treatment with medicines, as in psychosis, because they also affect the final formation of the brain.

The brain completion outside of the uterine environment and in contact with the social world through speech is a human morphology, at least as to the long period in which it occurs, and must have remarkable importance in cultural evolution, because the unconscious mind is recorded in the brain for turning emotions into rational behavior, always in cultural conditions that change over time, and therefore are always different. Thus human civilization has at the brain-mind a morphological structure that helps to explain the cultural evolution.

## **2.2 The Formation of Mind**

### **2.2.1 The Desire for the Object Forever Lost**

At the newborn, the brain is unfinished, which gives rise to a state of helplessness, because the baby has no coordination at all, and can't even hold the breast of the mother. "The delay in the development of the central nervous system during the first six months of the baby causes a state of vital impotence, psychological misery, connected to motor incoordination" (Jalley, 2009, p. 39).

From the state of helplessness, arises the sexual precocity, due to the intense contact with the mother's body and other persons, since the baby is unable to do anything, except try to establish communication, and therefore must be constantly manipulated by people. The human sexual development is said biphasic, as a first phase of libidinal development occurs

until the age of five, followed by a period of latency, and then follows a further period of libidinal development at puberty.

In the beginning the baby lives in a fusion with an object, which is the mother's breast, and in this situation of fusion between baby and mother, arises what Lacan calls *jouissance*, which is different from pleasure, because the *jouissance* is linked to the feeling of not being, of melting. The mind of the baby in the initial maternal fusion lives in maternal *jouissance*, and is totally unconscious. This unconscious is called by id, the oldest part of the psyche.

Being withdrawal from the mother, the baby cries, emitting signifiers (sound images linked to meanings), which represent the speech of the baby, vocalizing a desire by the forever lost object, which is the first sense of fusion with the mother. At maternal *jouissance*, the baby was a complete being, but as life departs him from the mother, the incompleteness arises, i.e., appears the lack. The *jouissance* is progressively transformed into speech, where the lack structures the desire for the lost object. Thus, in the economy of *jouissance*, each child's speech is a transformation of the primitive *jouissance* where the baby was placed, into some unconscious desire.

The next step is the emergence of sexual drives, for example, when moving away the baby from the mother to introduce the pacifier, at which the baby hallucinates in being still at the mother breast. Then come the two times of precocious sexuality coming from the state of helplessness. According to Jalley (2009, p. 279), "Freud describes the connection between the two times 'allo-' and 'auto-', the first time specific to the experience of the erogenous object (suction of warm milk), a starting time, soon followed by the second time, of the repeat in absentia (using pacifier)". Between both times of sexuality comes the lack, and the repetition of this alternation of times characterizes the onset of the sexual drive, which acts as a pulsation.

Thus the biological helplessness that results in sexual prematurity, generates both sexual drives, as similarly, death and self-preservation drives, to finally disembody into the psychic helplessness, since "The little being of very first childhood, Freud writes, is not effectively equipped to psychically dominate the large amounts of excitement that come to him from outside or inside" (Freud, 1965, p. 72) apud (Jalley, 2009, p. 261). The psychic helplessness generated by the repetitions of alternation between external and internal excitations, in turn leads to the formation of the second part of the psyche, the ego, separating it from the id.

*Faced with such a situation, the organism builds to itself a peripheral protective pellicle, which Freud, on several occasions, qualified as a shield against excitations, and that is nothing more than the primitive structure of the ego, as an organ of perception. "The differentiation between the ego and the id, Freud explains, is acquired early, in direct relation to the neonatal state of incompleteness and the vulnerability that from this results to the organism, relating to the previous excitation" (Jalley, 2009, p. 260).*

Thus, "The id is conceived as a set of pulsional nature contents" (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 399), from which arises the ego as a defense mechanism. Also, while the ego is young and weak, must reject to the id the stuff that it can't handle. "In consideration of its origin, we speak about the latter part of the id as the repressed" (Freud, 1974, p. 116). So, the id is composed of two parts, a repressed one, and the other innate.

### 2.2.2 The Symbolic, The Imaginary, and The Real

Lacan distinguishes two axes that make up the psychic reality, the symbolic and the imaginary. The symbolic is associated with speech and the id. In being manipulated, the baby cries and also hear the speech of the adults, storing signifiers (which are sound images associated to meanings) in the id, with some logical structure of cause and effect, present in the speech, which is the basis to structure the thought. The speech is the origin of the drive structure in the id, because when the baby passes from the breast to the pacifier and vice versa, hears the speech of the mother helping this passage, and therefore drives are stored in the form of signifiers. Hence the aphorism "the unconscious is structured like a language" (Lacan, 1998, p. 25).

The imaginary is not associated with imagination, as one might think, but to the image and the vision, where "the phenomena linked to the construction of the ego were aligned: capture, illusion, anticipation" (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, pp. 714-715). The development of the ego in the imaginary is posterior than the id in the symbolic, because the imaginary in the human being needs symbolic structures to be recognized by the baby.

The striking point taken as the beginning of the ego awareness is when the child recognizes himself in the mirror, what Lacan called the mirror stage, "the stage of development situated between six and eighteen months, or even two years; perhaps two and a half years" (Jalley, 2009, p. 39). "The body image is, therefore, structuring to the subject's identity, so that through it will be performed the primordial identification" (Dor, 1989, p. 80). Few kinds of animals, such as chimpanzees are capable of recognizing themselves in the mirror.

To Lacan, the imaginary and the symbolic are appropriated by the ego and the id, taking the form of a plot that covers the real, which is the reality. The real can only be grasped when coated by the plot of the symbolic with the imaginary. The human being, however is always incomplete because exists a remainder, i.e., an elusive part of the real, also called as the hole of the real, that gives access to the Freudian thing (das Ding), and that is the lack of the lost object.

### 2.2.3 The Desire By The Other'S Desire

Drives, primarily social, are the same for humans that the instincts, mainly innate, are for animals. The drive is characterized by four parts (Lacan, 1998, p. 154), the impulse, the source, the object, and the target. Especially in the period of helplessness, of incoordination, as in the case of the sexual drive already described, the baby needs the continued assistance of a third party, to try the drive satisfaction. Thus, the main objective of the baby is not to satisfy his needs, as happens with cubs of other animals, but to establish communication with the other, or be recognized by the other, and hence the desire for the lost object, takes the form of the desire by the other's desire.

*What sets the next stage, the motor impulsiveness, is the expressive character which takes the conditional reaction. The cry of the child, as it is often soothed by the bottle, becomes the sign of the desire to eat. As the attitude of the mother may be of consent or refusal, the child develops between the mother and she, a system of mutual understanding by gestures, attitudes and mimicry, whose base is clearly emotional. In state of total incompetence in the things in which the child is found, relations with others of this genre are the only means that she has to reach the most essential satisfactions of her existence. They come to the forefront of her psychic life. Already at the age of six months, she can expose a long repertoire of emotional nuances: anger, pain, sadness, joy. Long ago she responds with a smile to the mother... since there is a genuine affective*

*symbiosis after the organic symbiosis of fetal life (Wallon, 1956) apud (Jalley, 2009, p. 306).*

It is observed that the expression "the desire for the other's desire" appears in the same sense, and almost in the same format both in Kojève (2002, p. 14), commentator on Hegel, as in Lacan (1978a, p. 132), showing the influence of the course on Hegel that Lacan made with Kojève. But the desire of the other is also structured as a lack, i.e., it is mobile and can't complete the baby. Thus drives requirements can only be temporarily satisfied, and in this alternation between satisfaction and dissatisfaction arises emotions and similar feelings such as pleasure, happiness, frustration, anger, hostility, love, fear, fear, anxiety, sadness, etc...

So, passing the state of helplessness of the baby, to the state of dependency of the child, at about two years old, the baby is a human being who is experiencing the world in terms of emotions. He experiences every situation communally, as a part of it. In psychoanalytic approach to the development of the psyche, it is common to compare the primitive human being with the child, assuming that the experience of emotions is the common state they both lived in, modified by the phylogenetic and culture evolution in early human culture, and by the cultural experience of the child.

*Ties of the child with the environment are not reason or logical intuition, but the participation in situations in which she is placed, or could be involved and in everything that can motivate her. Somehow she mingles with them. Often I insisted on the importance that takes, already in the first months, their emotional reactions and that of their environment. For it establishes a kind of affective communion, that precedes, to the child, as no doubt in human history, the ideological relations. The role of emotions is undoubtedly an expression system of a pre-articulated language: one that would be required to enchain through a kind of contagion, powerful collective reactions. They were cultured as such by the rites of primitive peoples and currently remain the means of provoking gregarious reactions. Determining us, they conquer complementary or convergent impulses, and they merge them into a single sensory and active mass. From them, the individual belongs to his environment before belong to himself. At the psychological level, it is a kind of primitive community. This is, undoubtedly, the first phase in which the child's becomes aware (Wallon, 1947) apud (Jalley, 2009, pp. 307-308).*

#### **2.2.4 The Desire For The Object-Other**

During the period of helplessness, the baby passes through the desire for the lost object, and the desire for the other's desire, developing his emotions, to enter in the period of dependence, when she may already walk, pick up objects and interact with others, i.e., she is not totally helpless. At this point the human cub, that was a baby, becomes a child. But what happened to the psyche during the period of helplessness, where there was the formation of drives?

Due to helplessness, i.e., the motor disability, the baby's body was away from the mother several times and was intensively manipulated. During these manipulations, distinguishing more and less erogenous zones, with adults and baby speaking, each in their own way, the speech was stored on the id, as a corporal map of signifiers, where the signifier is a sound image connected to a meaning. This mental body is the first signifiers' network of the baby, that Lacan called S1, or the master signifier.

The master signifier S1 is the founder of the unconscious subject \$, creating the aphorism "a signifier represents a subject for another signifier" (Lacan, 1978b, p. 325), because it is from the articulation of signifiers that arises the desire of the unconscious subject. Here is done a parenthesis: Lacan, perhaps because of his psychiatric training, and subsequently by having accepted to analyze psychotics, which are more serious cases than neurotics, watched the unconscious as something that determines the ego with its unknowing, and so the subject is an unconscious subject, providing little autonomy to the ego, which is more an object of the unconscious subject.

Freud has not ventured much in this field that deals with determinism and free will of the subject, but he considered the ego as a place of consciousness. Jung, a disciple who distanced himself from Freud, founded Analytical Psychology, where there exists a process of individuation (Fernandes, 2102, p. 14), giving place to a gradual expansion of the ego consciousness. "After Freud, the ego, its design and the functions that it is supposedly the seat, would be a theoretical and political challenge, that would be the base of contradictory currents in the psychoanalytic movement" (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 212).

This paper advances this theoretical issue toward harmonizing the theoretical positions of Lacan and Jung, considering that the unconscious is a part of the mind (or psyche) indelibly etched in the brain, that makes the passage of emotions to the rational behavior of the ego. Thus there is an epistemological subject, that neither is the id, nor the ego, but both together with the superego, which is the third component of the psyche, and so there is a logically determined part of a subject, and also an autonomous part.

But the determinism of the subject increases and the free will decreases, as the subject passes through the basic characters of psychoanalysis, from normal to neurotic, perverse and psychotic. Likewise the ego consciousness evolves, like the id and the superego, much more throughout the ages, via the cultural improvement of transformations of emotions in rational action, than over the life of the subject, which is relatively very short.

But how is made the replacement of 'being an emotion' to 'have an object-other', because having can either refer to an inanimate object, or to a buddy? Through drives structured in the id as a language of signifiers, which will be channeled through chains that Lacan called S2, the unconscious knowledge. An example is the sexual drive already described where the pacifier replaces the maternal breast. In the terminology of Winnicott, the pacifier is a transitional object:

*Therefore, it is intended to protect the child from separation distress in the process of differentiation between ego and non-ego. A object is transitional for marking the passage, in the child, from a state where she is attached to the mother's body to a state where she is able to recognize the mother as different from her, and to separate each one: there's a transition from the fusional relationship (non-ego) to a symbolization of the reality of the word of objects (ego) (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 554).*

In Lacan's terminology, S1 is the signifier of the father's intervention, who keeps the baby away from the mother, but can also be considered as the call for the mother's return, or simply, as the maternal breast. The signifier of the pacifier is a metaphor of the signifier of the maternal breast, when the baby cries and starts psychically the signifiers chain (S2) that turns into metaphors one signifier to another since S1.

The S2 signifier chain functions as a succession of "transitional objects", coupled to each other, which are symbolized by speech, in the form of drives that are generated by repetition of alternating internal and external excitations, transforming symbolic behavior in emotional behavior, where rationality is given by the grammatical structures of cause and

effect present in the speech, which are stored as signifiers. An example is if after weaning, the baby pacifier would be gradually withdrawn, and the baby could pass to suck his thumb, in a new metaphor of the maternal breast in the S2 chain.

### 3. The Fort-Da game

The very representative point of the gradual removal of the mother, in the symbolic development, which for this paper shows how is made the transformation of emotional behavior into a behavior symbolic, rational and oriented to object, is the game of Fort-Da, which in German means "out-here". In this game, one child, who was the grandson of Freud, shoots a reel attached to a string under the bed, making it disappear, while uttering "oooo" (fort). After pulling the string, making the reel reappears, he pronounces "da".

*(...) never cried when her mother was away, but he had acquired a habit of playing with a wooden reel, tied to a string. He made the catch and threw the reel screaming "fort-da", thus expressing the grief that caused him the loss of the object and the pleasure he had in making it reappear (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 326).*

In this game, the absence of the mother, instead of causing a trauma to the child, is symbolized in the id by the reel play, whereby the child takes control of the situation, and can freely express his feeling of pleasure, when the mother comes back, and hostility, when the mother goes away. This ambivalence of the object, that is the mother, exists since the beginning of the baby's life, according to Klein, as a good mother when she is breastfeeding, and the bad mother, when she isn't (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 550).

*Through this play, Ernstl seemed to transform a situation in that he was passive, and would suffer danger or displeasure caused by the departure of the mother, in a situation of which he was the master, whatever the painful character that was repeated in it. To the first interpretation Freud added a second, complementary: the boy through that game, found a means of expressing hostile feelings, unmentionable in the presence of the mother, but able to satisfy his desire for revenge due to her departure. In other words, the boy could not bear the displeasure entailed by the game from the repetition of a separation, except for the fact that "an otherwise gain of pleasure, however direct, be linked to this repetition" (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 486).*

By the symbolization in the id of the absence of the mother, the child controls the fact of not being more fully the desire of the mother, where the desire for the other's desire, becomes the desire by the object-other. It is observed that the Fort-Da game is inscribed in the psyche as a drive, by the repeated alternation between external excitation (the comings and goings of the mother) and internal excitation (the reel game).

The alternation between the maternal breast and the pacifier will constitute a sexual drive, but also a self-preservation drive, because it protects the psyche of the baby. In the game of Fort-Da, there is a self-preservation drive, but also a death drive, by which the child can destructively symbolize the launch of the reel. Another important difference between the case of the pacifier and the Fort-Da, is that the first occurred in the period of helplessness, where the baby was eminently passive. The Fort-Da occurs in the period of dependency, where the child is active, and chooses the game that will symbolize the mother's separation.

*In fact, the child turned the situation, since from now on is she that symbolically abandons her mother. The operated symbolic inversion is the most obvious rationale for updating a control process: the child made*

*himself master of absence due to identification. It was the mother who repelled the child with the absence; now it is the child that repels the mother throwing the reel. Hence the intense jubilation of the child in discovering her control over the lack of the lost object (the mother). In other words, the fort-da shows us that she can basically control the fact of no longer being the sole and exclusive object of desire of the mother, that is, the object that fills the lack in the Other, i.e., the phallus. The child can then mobilize her desire as a subject's desire, using substitutes of the lost object. But, first and foremost, is the advent of language (the access to symbolic) that it will become an indisputable sign of the symbolic control of the lost object (...)* (Dor, 1989, p. 90).

What appears here is that the distance from the mother as a support to the baby, and after to the child, always increases, and drives are channeled and transferred to the object world (first the pacifier, later the reel), covering a number each time larger of objects-others. The Fort-Da game also features the importance of playing to the child's id. Toys or games with objects-others (including buddies) transfer emotional inputs to increasingly elaborate object outputs, as long as the child grows up.

This whole process of detachment from the mother implies in social behavior laws that cater to the principle of seeking pleasure respecting the dictates of objective reality contained in games and plays. These laws are internalized in the id by speech, through the structures of cause and effect of language that represents human reasoning. It is observed here that the pleasure principle and the reality principle take part in the structuring of drives, and are part of it, not just being a part of the functioning of the ego, where they will, to some extent, steer the social behavior of the subject.

Using Winnicott terminology to the whole formation of the id, it is as if there were a succession of transitional objects, which enable the child to leave mentally and gradually the mother. In Lacan's terminology, this succession of transitional objects is symbolized through signifiers as a succession of metaphors stored in the id, that make up the unconscious knowledge S2 from S1, the first signifier of the baby removal from the mother, which founded the unconscious subject \$.

On the trail of the unconscious desire, Lacan distinguishes however, two figures of speech, the metaphor and the metonymy, which correspond respectively to the displacement and the condensation, in Freudian terminology of dreams. The metaphor is a replacement operation, and the metonymy is an operation which takes the part for the whole. The metonymy can be understood as a desire for an object-other substitute, such as the pacifier or the reel. This is a diachronic time, because the object-other in the form of a metonymy, and the lost object metaphorized as the mother, coexist at the same instant of time.

As the lost object cannot be permanently replaced, the child ends up abandoning the former object-other for a new one. In this case, the former object-other changes from a metonymy to a new metaphor of synchronic chain S2, because the metaphor chain exists at the same instant of time, and at the tip of the S2 chain is placed the new object-other substitute, as a metonymy of the desire. It is the repeated alternation between the lost object metaphorized as the mother, and the metonymy of the new object-other substitute, which gives the drive channelization from emotional experience to the object world.

Along the S2 trail of signifiers in the form of metaphors and a metonymy, there is a progressive loss of maternal fusion jouissance, which becomes an unconscious desire present in the speech. The child's vocabulary expands representing the acquisition of objects-others of desire. Thus from the non-ego of maternal fusion, appears the unconscious subject S1,

followed by the S2 unconscious knowledge. When the formation of the id and the superego is finished through the Oedipus passage, at about five years old, they will change autonomously the aggressiveness of the R-complex and the emotions of the limbic system, in a behavior rational, symbolic and objective of the frontal lobes, i.e., of the ego. When passing by the Oedipus, the unconscious is finished, and so the child is turned off symbolically from her parents.

An important aspect of the id development, are plays and games of the baby / child to increase the ability to withstand frustration of desire, and move the desire forward on the S2 chain that turns emotions into objective symbolic behavior. The reality principle will establish the contours of the pleasure principle, and frustrate original desires and passions of the baby / child, and even of the adult. In response comes thoughts that develop themselves as a function of think, and end up grouping themselves in the reason, that seeks subject satisfaction by games and plays oriented to overcome the frustration, by the desire of objects-others substitutes over the life of the subject, including the sublimation of sexual drives and others by the cultural achievement (art, music, science, literature, etc ...).

*When you have to use the thoughts, according to the demands of reality, whether psychic or external, the primitive mechanisms must meet and show capabilities of precision that the need for survival requires. We must consider, therefore, in the same way, the role of life and death drives, and of the reason, which, being intended, in its embryonic form, under the hegemony of the pleasure principle, to serve as a slave to passions, was forced to take similar function as the lady of the passions and mother of logic. Is that the research, for the satisfaction of incompatible desires, would lead to frustration. The successful overcoming of the problem of frustration implies that the person must be reasonable, and the phrase "the dictates of reason" can frame the expression of primitive emotional reaction as a function that is intended to satisfy, not frustrate. The axioms of logic are rooted at the experience of reason which fails to fulfill its primary function of satisfying the passions, in the same way that a powerful reason reflects the ability of that function, to resist to assaults from its angry and frustrated lords. We consider these issues, as long as the dominance of the reality principle stimulate the development of thought and think, of reason, and the perception of psychic and environmental reality (Bion, 1963 - 1966, p. 152) apud (Ferreira, 2008, p. 145).*

#### **4. Conclusion**

The Game Theory is an epistemological shift that was not perceived in mainstream economics. Instead of Cartesian thinking subject who discovers that the economic agent is the homo economicus which solitary builds economic reality, doing exchanges and products for himself, Game Theory focuses the relationship between the "ego" and the "other", and therefore, in applying psychoanalysis to this situation, one finds that there may be more than one economic agent, as in the fable of the scorpion and the frog, and therefore the most appropriate for examining this relationship can be termed a Lacanian-Hegelian subject (Faveret, 2014).

What differentiates these agents is not rationality, but the unconscious desire that guides the action of the agent. But the desire goes through a long way to differentiate itself, through the desire of the lost object, the drives formation, through the desire of the other's desire, the emotions, and the desire for an object-other, which constitute the Lacanian unconscious knowledge S2, which will finally transform emotional experience in rational

symbolic behavior of the objective world. This long road of unconscious desire was presented in this paper.

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