

Leadership and Security Problems in Nigeria: A Critical Reflection

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Abstract

Security challenges have come to be the major concern in state building projects in post independent and post conflict societies like Nigeria. Security is fundamental as it provides an enabling environment for peace building and development. In a country like Nigeria that fought a bitter civil war and where ethnic cleavage is high, the need for security is not a subject to be taken for granted. This paper examines the role of leadership (and its failure) in the enthronement of a holistic people-centered security policy. It argues further that there is need for re-conceptualization and a fundamental shift in the policy and practice of security as obtained in other post conflict areas. It suggests a total overhaul in the nations security institutions if the spate of terrorist acts will be put to an end, giving the leadership time to concentrate on developing the nation.

Introduction

Security issues in the last decade have become the concern of National Leaders in Nigeria. This is because its implication for national security and economic stability and development is far reaching.

In the Niger Delta area, the periods between 2000 - 2010 witnessed untold restiveness, hostage-taking, insecurity and militancy, a development attributed to the plight of the people in the area who were largely condemned to high level poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and underdevelopment. Militancy and its security implications adversely affected the economy as billions of Naira were lost as crude oil production dropped drastically while expenditure on security matters increased in an attempt to make the country conducive for foreign investment. National leaders are now engrossed in the challenges of protecting lives and property, sustaining oil exploration to sustain the nation and protecting the country image as a peaceful heaven where all can come and invest. These enormous challenges that confronted Obasanjo who took over the reign of government in 1999 and informed the many undemocratic actions he took during the period of his presidency. It was also in an attempt to break the “spinal cord” of militancy that the amnesty “carrot” was extended to the militants. Let us briefly examine the Niger Delta in the period 2000-2010, to understand the security scenario.

The Niger Delta Region: Militancy and Hostage-Taking

The Niger Delta is an area rich in oil but lately it has become a bedrock of crises, to the extent that security challenges in the area has attracted international communities such as the USA and UK. From 2000 to 2009, the Niger Delta was characterized by crisis such as the Ekeremor crisis (Onyibe 2006), the Odi episode and the Ogbakiri crisis. These episodic crises were little compared to the ones that engulfed the Niger Delta between 2004-2009. There were reports of how Nigeria was flooded with weapons during the Liberian Civil War by returning soldiers and other individuals who discretely sold off weapons brought back with them. (Etaghene 2007). During the period preceding the 2003 and 2007 general elections, many politicians were suspected to have acquired arms and ammunitions and given to youths who needed them to terrorize their opponents. After the elections, many of the weapons were not returned to the owners by the youth, especially as politicians did not fulfill their promises. They were abandoned by the politicians they have helped into power. In an effort to ensure their survival, many of these youths resorted to crime with the guns and some of them became militants in the Niger Delta Area (Priye 2007).

Cult wars, militancy, hostage-taking and other vices were so widespread that it was believed that the politicians armed the hostage-takers in the convulsive drive to capture power. It was also believed that these sophisticated guns and jobless graduates were deployed to in guerilla warfare.

Hostage-taking was a new dimension in the equation of the crisis. The people of the Niger Delta being more conscious of the unequal distribution of resources and the exploitation of their God-given natural resources with no commensurate development resorted to a radical change in the means of achieving compliance and change on the part of the federal government and its agencies.

Using the Marxian or conflict theory to analyze the Niger Delta experience it is obvious that the people of the area had been exploited, marginalized and oppressed by the

Government and its agencies. Crude oil which was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in 1959 had transformed the landscape of virtually every part of the Nigerian state apart from Oloibiri and the Niger Delta which provided the economic wealth.

But more fundamental to the problem is the effect of the oil exploitation on the society and its people. The activities of oil companies has destroyed the natural environment, farmlands, rivers and lakes through spillage while the emission of dangerous substances and the environmental degradation resulting therefrom are not friendly and do not favour agricultural activities. The only way to draw government attention was to resort to the kidnapping of oil expatriates and the development of militant groups in the area. The result was the kidnapping and extortion of large sums of money from government leading to the death of some in the process.

The unwholesome development polluted relationship with some countries. Shell threatened to withdraw its activities from Nigeria if steps are not taken by Government to protect its personnel and activities. Julius Berger withdrew its business from the Niger Delta. The Government in an attempt to address the situation sent a contingent of JTF (Joint Task Force) to secure the area and confront the militants fire for fire. This resulted in losses on the side of the military and the militants.

It is the national security questions arising from the kidnapping of oil workers, children and parents of legislators and politically exposed individuals on the one hand and the escalating tension arising from the inability of the oil companies to meet production quota to shore up the countries revenue base that informed the amnesty programme.

Obi (1980) of the Nordic African Institute opined that the latest wave of attacks on oil institutions and kidnapping of foreign oil workers presents a security challenge to Nigerias paradoxically oil rich, but impoverished Niger Delta region. Oil pollution, perceived discriminatory employment practices in the oil industry and socio-political grievances were coming to a head as Nigeria concluded another general election in 2007. The combustible mix of repression and pent-up grievances had led to escalating violence, increasingly represented by youth and escalated militarization of the oil rich region. In the process of ensuring a harmonious and peaceful society both oil companies and host communities have become actors, targets, perpetrators and victims with far reaching consequences at the local, regional and international levels.

What does this escalation of violence and militancy portend for Nigeria, Africa's largest all exporter and the security of multi-billion dollar oil and gas investments?

A recent intelligence report predicted doom for the Nation. The report on the Niger Delta situation states that:

“the endemic corruption and the abject poverty in the Niger Delta provides an environment that favours several criminal activities including small arms dealing, money laundering and large scale oil theft that will continue the social disintegration of the Niger Delta if left unchecked”.

The Ya'r Adua amnesty programme is a commendable effort aimed at checking the slide into an irredeemable disintegration which the conflict would have plunged the Niger Delta and Nigeria into. The security implications for the economy and political stability is far reaching. The fear of this is coming on the heels of the terrorist scare, and the thinking is that prevalent socio-economic underdevelopment, marginalization and deprivation can

create an enabling environment for the rise of militant groups and restiveness in the Niger Delta region on Nigeria.

Leadership, Good Governance and Security

Leaders are those who hold positions of authority and can exercise power based on the office they occupy, be it at the public, private or national level. Political leaders are those leaders in the local, state or national levels who exercise authority based on the established power structure of the state. Political leaders have followers who sometimes are difficult and recalcitrant. Because of the nature of their followers, these leaders must not only be flexible but sensible enough to build a healthy relationship based on shared values of giving the good life to the generality of the populace.

The primary aim of political leaders at the National level is to ensure that they meet the welfare and the security needs of the citizenry. Political leaders must create an enabling environment for the citizens to pursue survival needs and be self actualized. The state is supposed to make life reassuring for the greatest number of its citizens by satisfying the physiological needs such as food, healthcare, education, employment and shelter.

Good governance is what the Nigerian state is yearning for and this entails the enthronement of proper democratic values, with responsive leaders, who know the essence of being in government. It should be a society devoid of fear, where the institutional frameworks are seen to work.

When leaders at the national level and indeed the state fail to appreciate the legitimate and genuine needs and aspirations of the citizens, that is, abdicate their responsibility for security, welfare and socio-political and economic well-being of the citizens, they create a propitious ground for rebellion as the case in the Niger Delta represents.

The Nigerian state is captured, dominated and personalized by a minority but powerful few that use state resource to meet selfish individual, parochial and ethnic ends. Such condition creates a pool of dissatisfied and disillusioned elements, ready to fight ethnic wars and this causes disorder.

The level of effectiveness or failure of Nigeria leadership is depicted by the neglect and dilapidation of its network of roads, dry taps, epileptic electricity, erratic temperamental telecommunication services, poor and ill-equipped hospitals and sordid state of a host of other infrastructures. The various frustrations of the majority of Nigerians arising from the failure or inability of the state and the leaders to meet their minimum requirements for survival are ventilated through violence and restiveness as the events in the Niger Delta reveals.

The inability of security agencies to be proactive in stemming the activities of militants and other disgruntled elements in the society is revealed in the massive destruction of lives and property in the country. The statistics of the destruction and number of lives lost are shocking and each case seems to catch the security agents napping. Many of them unsolved.

Figure 1: Statistics of insecurity cases between September 9, 1999 and January 29, 2011.

DATE	INCIDENCE
September 9, 1999	Sunday Ugwu was killed by gunmen who mistook him for his elder brother, Ugwu, a member of the Enugu State House of Assembly.

December 2000	Lai Balogun, a frontline politician and renowned architect was murdered.
December 18, 2001	Monday N Tambari, a member of Rivers State House of Assembly was murdered.
December 19, 2001	Odunayo Olagbaju, a member of Osun State House of Assembly was murdered.
December 23, 2001	Bola Ige, minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation, assassinated in his Ibadan, Oyo State home.
December 28, 2001	Dan Kemebigha, counsel to Odi youths in Bayelsa State, murdered.
January 7, 2002	Ade Awonusi, confidential secretary to Mohammed Uwais, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria was assassinated.
August 13, 2002	Janet Olapade, Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, leader in Odigbo Local Government, LG, Ondo State, assassinated.
November 2002	Dele Arojo, PDP governorship aspirant in Ogun State, murdered.
December 2002	Isyaku Mohammed, a United Nigeria Peoples Party chieftain was murdered.
December 12, 2003	John Agbatutu, PDP, Delta Central Senatorial District aspirant, murdered.
February 8, 2003	Ogbonnaya Uche, a chieftain of All Nigeria Peoples Party, ANPP, Imo State, murdered.
February 22, 2003	Theodore Agbatu, the principal secretary of the Imo State governor was murdered.
March 5, 2003	Marshal Harry, the South-South vice chairman of PDP, before he defected to ANPP, was murdered.
March 20, 2003	Rasaki Ibrahim, a supporter of Mohammed Lawal, the former governor of Kwara State, was assassinated.
March 21, 2003	Anthony Nwodo, secretary of ANPP Ezza North LG, Eboyin State, assassinated.
March 27, 2003	Yemi Oni, Alliance for Democracy, AD, stalwart in Ekiti State, assassinated.
April 19, 2003	Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu, ANPP stalwart in Ikeduru, Imo State, murdered.
April 20, 2003	Tony Dimegwu, ANPP House of Assembly member in Imo State Murdered.
May 3, 2003	Joyce Fatai, former Nassarawa State Commissioner for Women Affairs and Social Development, murdered.
June 20, 2003	Ajibola Olanipekun, a lawyer and PDP member in Ibadan, Oyo State, murdered.
October 2003	Chimere Ikoku, PDP chieftain and former Vice Chancellor of University of Nigeria, Nsukka, murdered.
January 6, 2004	Aminasoari Dikibo, South-South national vice chairman of PDP, assassinated.
March 3, 2004	Andrew Agowa, a member of the PDP's Board of Trustees and Joseph Ngama, a police sergeant in the convoy of George Akume, governor of Benue State was killed.
March 4, 2004	Luke Shingaba, a chairmanship candidate in Bassa LG, Kogi State, assassinated.
March 7, 2004	Philip Olorunipa, a Kogi State electoral commissioner, murdered.
February 5, 2005	Sunday Atte, a leader of the legislative council in Yagba East, LG, Kogi State, murdered.
March 15, 2005	Alabi Olajoku, a political associate of Rauf Aregbesola, the then governorship candidate in Osun State and now governor of the state, assassinated.
June 3, 2005	Lateef Olaniyan alias Lati Osogbo, a close associate of the strongman of Ibadan

	politics, late Lamidi Adedibu, assassinated.
July 27, 2005	Jesse Arukwu, a governorship aspirant of the defunct Advance Congress of Democrats, murdered.
July 30, 2006	Funsho Williams, a governorship aspirant of PDP in Lagos State, assassinated.
August 14, 2006	Ayo Daramola, a governorship aspirant of PDP in Ekiti State, assassinated.
September 19, 2006	Mohammed Imam, chairman of ANPP, Borno State, assassinated.
October 5, 2006	Omololu Falobi, a former editor of The Punch newspaper and executive director of Journalists Against AIDS (JAAIDS) was assassinated in his car on his way back home in Alakuko, Lagos State.
December 23, 2006	Godwin Agbroko, the chairman of the Editorial Board of This Day was murdered on his way home in Lagos.
January 27, 2007.	Ego Cordelia Uzoezie, the then Anambra State Commissioner for Women Affairs alongside her son Kenechukwu were kidnapped at Nsugbe on her way from Orizu College of Education Awka, Anambra State, where she had been a lecturer. The kidnappers demanded N50 million ransom.
January 27, 2007	Pius Ogbuawa, a businessman from Nnewi, Anambra State was kidnapped and N20 million was demanded as ransom.
April 30, 2007	Cecilia Omehia, 70-year-old mother of Celeatine Omehia, ex-governor of Rivers State was kidnapped.
May 1, 2007	Six expatriate staff of Chevron Nigeria Limited in Port Harcourt, Rivers State were kidnapped.
May 19, 2007	Two Indians based in Port Harcourt, Rivers State were kidnapped.
May 30, 2007	Segun Awenebi, former chief security officer to Segun Agagu, Ondo State governor was murdered.
June 2, 2007	Four expatriate staff of Schlumberger in Rivers State, kidnapped.
June 26, 2007	Michael Stewart, son of a female member of Rivers State House of Assembly was kidnapped.
July 5, 2007	Margret Hill, three-year-old British girl in Rivers State was kidnapped.
July 2007	Samuel Amadi, son of Chief Francis Amadi, an Iriebe community leader, Rivers State was kidnapped.
August 25, 2007	Hansel Seibaragu, 70-year-old mother of Werinipre Seibaragu, ex-Speaker of Bayelsa State House of Assembly was kidnapped.
September 8, 2007	About 11 members of PDP in Ese-Odo, Ondo State, were kidnapped.
September 14, 2007	Segun Oladimeji, fondly called Segelu, a PDP member of the House of Representatives representing Akinyele/Lagelu Federal Constituency, Oyo State was assassinated.
September 2007	David Ward, a Briton and worker with Hydro-Dive Limited of Rivers State was kidnapped.
October 9, 2007	Jiffy Kolomonibo, 82, blind and father of Ebioudu Kolomonibo, a member of the Bayelsa State House of Assembly, was kidnapped.
October 29, 2007	Joseph Edem, ten-year-old boy at school in Calabar, Cross Rivers State, was kidnapped.
January 8, 2008	15-year-old son of Ogochukwu Onyiri, Secretary, PDP, Rivers State chapter was

		kidnapped.
February 7, 2008		Seinye Briggs, wife of Lulu Briggs, the executive vice-chairman, Moni Pulo was kidnapped.
March 23, 2008		Stevenson Odemwingie, Lucky Martins and two staff of Mamatan Oil Company, Okirika, Rivers State were kidnapped.
March 25, 2008		Mrs. Ejiogu, wife of Samuel Ejiogu, a politician in Etche, Rivers State, was kidnapped.
March 29, 2008		Five staff of Express Oil, Awoye, Ondo State were kidnapped.
April 2008		Sarah Nwakaudu a 75-year-old woman from Umuahia, Abia State was kidnapped.
April 6, 2008		Patricia Asiota, wife of a member of House of Representatives from Rivers State and Chidi Nzerim, 11, a student of Brookstone International School, Ikwerre, Rivers State, were kidnapped at different locations.
April 20, 2008		Ngozi Nneji, wife of Frank Nneji, ABC Motors boss in Imo State, kidnapped.
April 26, 2008		Patrick Mbamalu Okeke, 73-year-old traditional ruler in Abagana Njikoka council, Anambra State, kidnapped.
May 2008		Celestin Ngobiwu, member of Imo State House of Assembly, representing Obowo Constituency, Imo State, kidnapped.
May 2008		Simon Iwunze, a member of Imo State House of Assembly, representing Mbanu Constituency in Imo State, kidnapped.
May 2008		Christopher Chukwu, an octogenarian, kidnapped.
June 8, 2008		Bob Izua, a managing director of Bob Izua Motors, Benin City, Edo State, kidnapped. He was released after a N5 million ransom was paid.
June 14, 2008		Two Germans and four Nigerians at Dodo Creeks, Ekeremor council area, Bayelsa State were kidnapped.
June 19, 2008		Ginikachi Udeagu, daughter of Ebere Udeagu, former deputy governor of Imo State was kidnapped.
July 21, 2008		Arthur Okowa, 76, father of Okowa, the then secretary to the Delta State government was kidnapped.
August 1, 2008		Ndubueze, a traditional ruler of Rumolumeni, Rivers State was kidnapped.
August 2, 2008		Two-year-old son of the bursar of Anambra State University of Science and Technology was kidnapped.
August 11, 2008		Azubike Nmerukini, chairman of Port Harcourt City LG was kidnapped.
August 13, 2008		Wife of Wole Adekoya, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Water Resources in Ogun State was kidnapped.
August 15, 2008		Barineme Fakae, a professor and vice chancellor of River State University of Science and Technology was kidnapped.
August 17, 2008		Abayomi Ogundeji, an Editorial Board member of ThisDAY newspaper was shot dead in Akowonjo, Lagos State.
August 25, 2008		Kelechi Nwankpa, chairman of Obingwa council in Abia State was shot dead on his way to his office. His driver was kidnapped and later released after payment of N10 million ransom.
September 9, 2008		Two expatriates, a Briton and Irish national working with Pan Oceanic Oil Corporation in Warri, Delta State were kidnapped.
November 15, 2008		Joseph Dimobi, a member of Anambra State House of Assembly, representing

2008	Aniocha 11 Constituency, Anambra State, kidnapped.
November 21, 2008	Eze Eberechi Dick, traditional ruler of Mgboko Agwa Amaise Autonomous Community in Abia State, kidnapped.
January 6, 2009	Effiong Nelson, former Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly Speaker, Uyo, kidnapped.
February 1, 2009	Orabule Adiele, former Attorney-General of Rivers State, kidnapped.
April 15, 2009	Julie Mulligan, a Canadian and member, Rotary International, Kaduna State, kidnapped.
August 16, 2009	Pete Edochie, a movie star was kidnapped in Onitsha, Anambra State.
August 20, 2009	Grace Mamah, wife of James Mamah, a multi-millionaire transport mogul, kidnapped at National College of Education, Nsukka, Enugu State.
August 2009	Nkem Owoh, popular actor and comedian, popularly known as Osuofia, kidnapped along Enugu-Port Harcourt Express way.
August 23, 2009	Godwin Okere, chairman, GUO Motors, kidnapped at All Saints Anglican Church, Onitsha, Anambra State.
September 2009,	Waje Yayok, the secretary to the Kaduna State government kidnapped from his residence in Kaduna.
September 20, 2009	Bayo Ohu, assistant news editor, The Guardian newspaper was assassinated at his Egbeda residence, Lagos.
October 28, 2009	Simon Soludo, 78-year-old father of Chukwuma Soludo, the then governor, Central Bank of Nigeria was kidnapped.
December 2009	Chijioke Iheaku, 40, a lawyer, kidnapped and later murdered.
January 2010	Eze Samuel Ohiri, traditional ruler of Orodo in Mbaitoli LG, Imo State, father of Festus Ohiri and cousin, Josiah Ohiri were murdered by kidnappers.
March 2, 2010	Justice ABC Egu, president of Customary Court of Appeal, Ugoeze Pauline Njemanze, wife of Eze Emmanuel Njemanze, the Ozuruigbo of Owerri, Professor Sam Omenyi, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Academics), Nnamdi Azikiwe Univeristy, Awka, Professor Egwuatu, director of academics, the dean of studies of the same university, and three journalists working for a South-African-based sports television outfit, were kidnapped along the Sam Mbakwe Airport Road, Owerri, Imo State.
March 4, 2010	Ademola Adegbile, chairman of the PDP, Atiba LG, Oyo State, murdered.
March 15, 2010	Stella Odimegwu, wife of Chief Festus Odimegwu, former chief executive officer, Nigerian Breweries, kidnapped in Assah Ubirielelem, Orsu LG, Imo State.
May 21, 2010	Polycarp Ndubueze, medical director, Chika Medical Centre, Osina, Ideato South LG, Imo State, kidnapped.
May 26, 2010	Osaro Osifo, a dentist at the Central Hospital, Benin City, Edo State, kidnapped.
June 13, 2010	Sunday Njoku, the traditional ruler of Umebulu Community in Rivers State was kidnapped in church.
July 11, 2010	Wahob Oba, chairman, Nigerian Union of Journalists, and three other members of the union and their driver, kidnapped at Obingwa LG, Abia State.
December 30, 2010	Lateef Salako, alias Elewe Omo, the factional Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), was killed at a primary school in Ogbere-Olunloyo, Ibadan, Oyo State, during the PDP LG congress.

January 1, 2011	Akpan Akpudo, a medical doctor and Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly aspirant, murdered near St. Luke's General Hospital at Anua, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.
January 1, 2011	Lukman Adeshina and Taiwo Adeshina, two brothers were shot dead by a police corporal at a checkpoint after their refusal to give N20 bribe at Ikurin-Osogbo Road, Ikurin, Osun State.
January 29, 2011	Modu Fannami Gubio, a governorship candidate and Goni Sherriff, a brother to Borno State governor, Ali Modu Sherriff were shot dead by unknown gunmen alongside five other people on their way home after performing Jumat services at the palace of the Shehu of Borno.

Source: TELL Magazine, February 21, 2001.

Late in 2010, a new dimension was introduced into the spate of violence in Nigeria and that is the use of bomb blasts as a weapon of attracting government attention and settling disputes. The use of bomb blasts are in the main associated with terrorists and radical Islamists movements have been fingered as specialists in the use of this extreme and ruthless destructive method. The intention of these revolutionary organizations is overthrowing the state (Freedom et al 1986:1) but is the case with the Nigerian experience, who is the terrorist and how prepared is the Nigerian government to confront this new dimension of security challenge?

Terrorism and Security Challenges in Nigeria

The Nigerian state is not new to conflict and crisis. Since the amalgamation of 1914 and like most plural and divided societies, it harbours diverse disruptive tendencies and had witnessed a number of religious and ethnic or cultural crises as events in the Niger Delta, middle belt and some parts of the far North have shown. It is indeed a fact of daily life of Nigerians. But these pockets of crises have not been described as act of terrorism.

Terrorism is a widespread method of political action or reaction to political failure, consequently, there is no unit of the international system that has not got a cause to confront it one way or the other. Yasser Arafat in 1974 addressed the UN General Assembly and stated "many of you who are here in this Assembly were (once) considered terrorist". Indeed many of them had once been hunted and had hunted other men themselves which demonstrates the political character of terrorism as an instrument that has mid-wifed the birth of many of the world's now sovereign state (Time Magazine November 25 1974). The implication is that an individual is terrorism perception of organizations like the PLO, Mau Mau FLN, the Irgun Zrai, and stern Geng is a function of the side the individual is on the disputation or conflict that led to their emergence. This was why Menachem Begin, the former Israeli Prime Minister, while an ardent Irgun Partisan wrote that "our enemies called us terrorists, our friends patriots".

From the foregoing, it is obvious that no universally accepted conception of terrorists has emerged and this absence of definition "opens the door to double standards". However, one must recognize that terrorism is a specific method of struggle rather than a synonym for political violence or insurgency meaning that it can be employed by an infinite variety of actors in the international system including governments, political factions, criminal gangs, cults and religious movements, and that is by no mean the monopoly of any particular ideology, political philosophy or religion.

A terrorist is essentially a dispenser of violence. The terrorists immediate objective, until the emergence of the al-Qaeda was to use force for the purpose of creating fear and in the way to attain whatever further aim he may have in mind (Schwarzenberger 1971:219). But today, the terrorist, in addition to the creation of fear, tends to use force indiscriminately and on an excessive scale; the reason being that whenever his aim is not merely revenge or retaliation, he seeks to attain his objective, whatever it may be, by the creation of both fear and excessive pains and as it is difficult to anticipate fear is likely to produce the desired results, the terrorist is thus likely to overact.

The propensity of the “new” as different from the “old” terrorists to overact in the inflicting of physical pain has negated the traditional conception of the terrorist as one whose principal motivation is the creation of fear or psychological effects that are not of the proportion to its purely physical result. The transcendence of the physical over the psychological effects in the activities of the terrorist has become very remarkable since 9/11. Thus it is no longer right to say that “ruthless destructiveness is not the prerogative of the terrorist”, as it is not also fashionable to denominate terrorism into any religion, for it is a weapon that is applied by a variegation of actors in the international system, rather it is more objective to say that religion gives more incentive to the political motives of terrorist (Pyadyshev 2004).

Terrorism therefore is a weapon which appears to be unavoidably political, for it is “the use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims and with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demand of the perpetrators (Shan 2002:346).

Until 9/11 terrorism was seen as a deliberate means to an end, that perhaps informed the reference to the terrorism of the time as one which reached for more psychological rather than physical effects. But the destructions of 9/11, and thereafter, have increasingly identified terrorists as mindless, senseless and steeped in the proclivity for wanton violence. Even after 9/11 the emergent terrorists have demonstrated a sufficient mindless destructiveness and psychopath in its anthrax (biological weapon) letter attacks which followed 9/11, 2001 (Wardlaw 1982:16)

The question one may likely ask is how was Nigeria drawn into this unwholesome scenario?

International Terrorism Experience

The point has been made above that international terrorism, as a phenomenon is a novel in Nigeria until the recent times. Moreover, the association of Nigeria with the scourge outside the continents is also recent. What however is not new in Nigeria is the problem of state terrorism and the terrorism of insurgent groups all of which are local in character and manifest themselves in section violence, civil wars that transgress humanitarian laws and aggravated spread of terror amongst civilian populations and government. In fact until recently, the prevalent terror in Nigeria was the terror in armed conflicts (Myroie 2001:241).

Nigeria on three occasions has been associated with international terrorism. The first involved the Nigeria states, when the Buhari/Idiaghon military regime toppled the Shagari government and declared Alahaji Umaru Dikko, Shagari’s Minister of Transport

and close associate wanted for massive corruption and pillage of the Nigerian economy. The military government sponsored the kidnap of Dikko, during which he was drugged and crated to be foiled by a bystander who saw Alhaji Dikko being dragged from his Porchester Terrace and alerted the anti-terrorist C13 unit of Scotland land. The wooden cargo bearing Dikko was intercepted and Dikko liberated (Powell and Goodman 2004).

The second transnational terrorist incident involved a politically disaffected Nigerian group in the wake of the June 12, 1993 presidential election annulment believed to have been won by the business mogul MKO 319 passengers were hijacked by some young men who claimed to be members for the movement for the advancement of democracy. Armed with pistols, knives, petrol and matchets they hijacked and diverted the aircraft from its Abuja destination to Niamey, the Nigerian capital. They demanded the abolition of the Interim National Government and the transfer of power to the National Assembly and the unmasking of those who looted the Nigerian economy including 3000 government officials, especially those that stashed away 33 billion Dollars in some Swiss Banks within 72 hours. The terrorist were dislodged by about 50 commandos of the Niger Republic Police who stormed the aircraft, rescued the hostages and arrested the hijackers.

However, it was the attempted terrorist attack of young Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab that made history when in 2009 he tried to blow up an Arsterdam-to-Detroit North-West Airlines flight 253. Since then Nigeria has been in the search light of investigations as a heaven for Al-Qaeda operatives. The Nigerian Taliban now known as Boko Haram have become more daring.

The use of bomb blast has become a new method in the attempt of extremist to attract public attention. In October 1 during Nigeria's 51st independence anniversary a bomb blast rocked the venue of celebration killing and wounding many. Before then a similar blast rocked the venue of amnesty discussion in Delta State leading to the abrupt end of the discussions.

The unfortunate thing is that the innocent suffer while a large number of death were recorded. Private and public property were destroyed leaving everyone confused. The security system lay bare and the leaders and top military brass watched not knowing what to do and pretend as if nothing happened. The press shouted itself hoarse and in a few weeks everyone went about his or her business as if nothing was amiss.

The successive blasts in Abuja with series of deaths and several vehicles burnt beyond description is a bold statement that terrorism has arrived Nigeria. The most resent is the bombing of the United Nation Office in Abuja. The effective bombing of sensitive institutions in Abuja by Boko Haram has laid bare the unprepared state of the security operatives to tackle terorism. The menace of Boko Haram has become the greatest challenge as statistics below depicts. The presidency and all arms of government are restless tinkering new ideas and technology to use in quashing the mayhem.

Figure 2: Boko Haram activities.

S/N	Date	Incident Details
1.	In July, 2009	Several leaders were arrested in Bauchi, sparking <u>deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces</u> which led to the death of an estimated 700 people.
2.	On July, 30	Allegations were made that the Mohammed Yusuf himself was killed by the police after being taken to custody.
3	In January	Boko Haram killed four people in Dala Alemderi ward in

	2010	Maiduguri metropolis.
4.	On September 7, 2010	Book Haram freed over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State.
5	In December 2010	Boko Haram bombed a market in Maiduguri following which 92 of its members were arrested by police.
6	On Friday January 28, 2011	The Borno State candidate of All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) for the April 2011 gubernatorial elections was assassinated, along with his brother, four police officers and a 12-year old boy. Boko Haram has been blamed for these killings, other commentators have noted that the assassination of the ANPP governorship candidate Mr. Modu Fannami Gubio was politically motivated. No evidence has been offered for Boko Haram's involvement.
7	On Tuesday February 8, 2011	Boko Haram gave conditions for peace. The radicals demanded that the Borno State Governor, Senator Ali Modu Sherriff, should step down from office with immediate effect and also allow members to reclaim their mosque in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State.
8	On 9 th May 2011	Boko Haram rejected an offer for amnesty made by the governor-elect of Borno State.
9	On 29 March 2011	Police "thwarted a plot to bomb an (ANPP) election rally" in Maiduguri, Borno State. Boko Haram was suspected to be behind the plot.
10	On April 1, 2011	The day before the original date of Nigeria's legislative elections, suspected Boko Haram members attacked a police station in Bauchi.
11	On April 9, 2011	A polling centre in Maiduguri was bombed.
12	On April 15, 2011	Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission was bombed, and several people were shot in a separate incident on the same day. Authorities suspected Boko Haram.
13	On April 20, 2011	Boko Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police offices in Maiduguri.
14	On April 22, 2011	Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State.
15	On May 29, 2011	Boko Haram was blamed for series of bombings in northern Nigeria that left 15 dead.
16	On June 17, 2011	Boko Haram claimed responsibility for bombing the police force headquarters in Abuja. Officials believed that the attack was first suicide bombing in Nigeria's history and that it specifically targeted Police Inspector-General Hafiz Ringim.
17	On June 26, 2011	Boko Haram carried out a bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri, according to officials and witnesses. Militants on motorcycles threw explosives into the drinking spot, killing about 25 people.

18	On June 27, 2011	Another bombing in Maiduguri attributed to the group killed at least two girls and wounded three customs officials.
19	On July 03, 2011	Boko Haram attacked a beer garden in Maiduguri and killed at least twenty people.
20	On July 10, 2011	Boko Haram bombed a church. The All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State.
21	On July 11, 2011	The University of Maiduguri was closed down because of security concerns.

Source: Various news paper reports.

So much had been written on Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. It is painful that despite all efforts and series of warnings, and the fact that most of the leaders are known by the security agencies, they have continued to go scot free because of the system. There is need for a total overhaul of the system, from the bottom to the top. Those that have been found culpable should be shown the way out. To secure Nigeria, its citizens and all that do business in Nigeria, a total reform of the existing system is needed. That is the only solution but the question is to what extent? Is the present crop of leadership willing to do that? How far are they willing to go?

Precondition for Security Reform

The objective of security reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to the development, poverty reduction and democracy (OECD 2005:58). The holistic, people-oriented approach to security can be considered a subset of peace building. The desire is rooted in the notion that the absence of a responsible and accountable security sector possessing a monopoly on the use of coercive force will invariably prompt the population to seek security from other sources leading to the proliferation of weapon and non-statutory security forces. Security reform if properly implemented will strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to provide an accountable, equitable, effective and rights respecting service. The aim is to mould the security sector into an instrument for consolidating and upholding the peace rather than to threaten or unravel it.

It must be noted that a number of conditions are necessary for a successful security reform. First, the programme must be locally evaluated, for what may appear to be productive from the perspective of the international community may have significantly different connotations and effect when judged by domestic actions.

Second, even if the powers are successful in entrenching formal western-oriented security structures, the attitude beneath them may be deeply wielded to old ways (Channa 2002:42). Accordingly, the principles, policies, laws and structures developed during the reform process must be reconciled with the history, outline and legal frameworks.

Thirdly, for this reform to take root, a minimum level of security is required. Security reform cannot take root in a security vacuum. It is a long-term process intended to address the structural causes of insecurity not a means to confront immediate security threats post conflicts

Fourth, implementing comprehensive reforms owned and directed by local action require at least the foundation of stable institutions and human capacity. In Nigeria that is recovering from civil strife, institutional and human capacity though available, is

hampered by sectional cleavages. Determining the process and how to sequence reforms is exceedingly difficult.

Fifth, with the multiplicity of local stake holders involved in the process, it is important to establish mechanism to ensure the coherence of security reforms at the planning and operational levels. Security reforms can take up to a decade to reach its fruition. There is no quick fix security reform. Security reforms require a long-term outlook and durable supplies of resources to succeed. These preconditions provide the bases with which to gauge the impact of the security reforms Nigeria must undertake to make the society safe.

Security Reforms in Nigeria

If Nigeria must rid itself of this toga of insecurity, the reform process must be holistic and must affect four aspects (a) military reform (b) police reform (c) judicial reform and (d) disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-militant. It is important to note that to be effective, the hindrance posed by capacity deficits, co-ordination breakdown and precarious security environment must be dealt with. Emphasis will be place on only the military, police and judicial reform pillars, the core of any security agenda in post conflict states.

Military Reform

The military reform process must entail the reform in the Ministry of Defense. The investigation unit of this ministry must be strengthened. The rate of retirement of top brasses in the Army, Airforce and Navy must be put on hold for now. That way, experience and committed gentlemen loyal to the democratic institution will still be in the force to check political officers. Barracks should be renovated to make them living places for human beings and not rat holes. The military now deserves an enhanced salary structure and the institution of strict quotas to ensure that the force adequately reflects Nigeria ethnic mosaic.

Nigerian soldiers have reportedly performed well in joint international operations. However, they still need more exposure and training. There is need for enhanced competence, professionalism and greater ethnic parity. Nigeria is yet to arrive at a stage where its armed forces could be described as efficiently professional, non-political, effective and truly representative of the country. Reforms in the democratic institution intended to govern the armed forces was treated as an afterthought. It must be isolated from the institution intended to manage them.

Police Reforms

In spite of the centrality of the police in combating Nigeria's array of democratic threats – including terrorism, illegal border incursions, illicit trade, oil bunkering, militancy, and organized crime – the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Nigerian Police Service Commission have not received resources and attention commensurate to that of the Nigerian Army. Reform in the police is mainly aimed at re-fashioning existing structures and personnel. The result of this approach is that the police largely consist of those who go into the profession as a last resort or to fight unemployment. Consequently, they seem to owe no allegiance to the nation. The Nigerian Police is widely regarded as dysfunctional and has little impact on improving the security situation on the ground.

The result of this is that the Nigerian Police continues to be ill-trained, poorly paid, under-equipped and inadequately armed. In the light of the situation, it is not surprising that illegal toll gates and criminal patterns of behavior have become a prominent feature of the police service. The police had perpetrated 15% of all human rights abuses and 10% of extra judicial killing reported in Nigeria. The most common offences reported are torture, forcible theft of property and failure to prosecute murder cases.

In spite of attempts made to improve the situation, the reform process has failed to alter existing pattern of behavior in the Police or establish oversight mechanism to mitigate abuses. Rather than creating community police capable of upholding the rule of law and meeting the human security needs of the population, the process would produce another layer of security force – albeit largely ineffective to supplement the Nigerian Army in counter terrorism and counter insurgent operations.

Judicial Reforms

The Judiciary has improved in the last one decade. There had been steps taken to reconstruct the judicial system including the re-establishment of Nigeria Judicial Council with the supervision of the Judicial and prosecutorial system; the rehabilitation of vital infrastructure, the training and vetting of judicial personnel and the reform of the legal codes.

The reform has been ad hoc and disjointed and has received only a fraction of the resources meant for the institution. The failure to address the problems in the justice system early is perhaps the most damaging theme that has hindered a holistic approach.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is apparent that leadership is an integral part of these security reform problems faced by Nigeria. Until the leadership is committed to finding solutions to the myriad of problems confronting the nation and the will to make a difference, the problems will persist. The issues highlighted show the inadequacy of these institutions in complex environments. Realizing the principles and goals of the concept in the Nigerian environment requires more than just the reform or reconstruction of institutions but the transformation of norms and mindsets about security. Implementing security reforms amid conditions of fundamental systematic transformation and profound human and state insecurity requires a conceptual framework quite distinct from the ordinary.

The securitization of the process is clearly perceptible in Nigeria where initiatives to advance the rule of law and establish democratic controls over the sector have overshadowed efforts to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the security forces through train and equip programmes. Strengthening security forces without instituting democratic principles, erecting robust democratic oversight mechanisms and entrenching the rule of law ignores one of the core concepts upon which the security reforms is meant to address. That is that security forces left unchecked can be a dangerous tool, rather than a solution to instability and insecurity. It creates the impression that the process is geared to “containing” the threat posed by failed post conflict states rather than address the structural causes of instability and insecurity. But perhaps the most important question is whose security does it seek to advance? Is it geared towards advancing the security of individuals or that of the international community? Whatever the agenda it is aimed at

creating a more secure Nigeria, and a situation of “controlled insecurity”, preventing insecurity from spilling across the borders into other states and wider international community in the form of terrorism, organized crime and refugees. The “business as usual” approach to security issues in Nigeria must be addressed if the life and property of its citizenry are meaningful.

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